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INTRODUCTION
Across jurisdictions, one or both parties typically are unrepresented1 in a
minority of filed general civil cases (3% to 48%), in a majority of domestic
relations cases (35% to 95%), and in most cases in small claims and housing courts (79% to 99%).2 Whether unrepresented litigants are able to obtain a fair result in litigation is a major concern, given their lack of information about court forms and processes, lack of knowledge of substantive law
and rules of evidence and procedure, and lack of case presentation and negotiation skills.3 Additional concerns are the potential burdens that large
numbers of unrepresented parties might pose for court staff and judges.4
1. This article uses the term “unrepresented” litigants; comparable terms include selfrepresented, pro se, and pro per.
2. See, e.g., JONA GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF PRO SE LITIGATION: A REPORT AND GUIDEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND COURT MANAGERS 8 (1998); JOHN M.
GREACEN, SELF REPRESENTED LITIGANTS AND COURT AND LEGAL SERVICES RESPONSES TO
THEIR NEEDS 3-8 (2002), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/cfcc/pdffiles/
SRLwhatweknow.pdf; NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, SELF-REPRESENTATION: PRO SE STATISTICS
(2006),
available
at
http://www.ncsconline.org/wc/publications/memos/
prosestatsmemo.htm; Connie J. A. Beck & Bruce D. Sales, A Critical Reappraisal of Divorce Mediation Research and Policy, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 989, 993 (2000); Deborah J. Chase, Pro Se Justice and Unified Family Courts, 37 FAM. L.Q. 403, 404-05 (2003);
Craig A. McEwen et al., Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant Approaches to
Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1317, 1359, 1390-91
(1995);Carroll Seron et al., The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor Tenants in
New York City’s Housing Court: Results of a Randomized Experiment, 35 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 419, 420-21 (2001). See generally BOSTON BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE
ON UNREPRESENTED LITIGANTS (1998), available at http://www.bostonbar.org/prs/reports/
unrepresented0898.pdf.
3. See ABA TASK FORCE ON ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES 3 (2006) [hereinafter ABA TASK FORCE], available at https://www.abanet.org/
legalservices/sclaid/downloads/06A112A.pdf; GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 2, at 52-54,
118; GREACEN, supra note 2, at 12; LYNN MATHER ET AL., DIVORCE LAWYERS AT WORK:
VARIETIES OF PROFESSIONALISM IN PRACTICE 43-44, 67 (2001); BRUCE D. SALES ET AL.,
SELF-REPRESENTATION IN DIVORCE CASES 14 (1993); Steven K. Berenson, A Family Law
Residency Program?: A Modest Proposal in Response to the Burdens Created by SelfRepresented Litigants in Family Court, 33 RUTGERS L. J. 105, 115 (2001). See generally
BOSTON BAR ASS’N, supra note 2. Lists of the tasks lawyers perform when representing
clients indicate the skills that non-lawyers lack. See, e.g., HERBERT M. KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER: LAWYERS AND ORDINARY LITIGATION 90-91 (1990) [hereinafter KRITZER,
JUSTICE BROKER]; MATHER ET AL., supra, at 67; Berenson, supra, at 130-31; Alicia M. Farley, An Important Piece of the Bundle: How Limited Appearances Can Provide an Ethically
Sound Way to Increase Access to Justice for Pro Se Litigants, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 563,
569-71 (2007); Forrest S. Mosten, Unbundling: Current Developments and Future Trends,
40 FAM. CT. REV. 15, 16 (2002); Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary
Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949,
1080 (2000). Research has found that even lawyers have difficulties when they litigate
cases in settings different than those in which they usually practice. See, e.g., KRITZER, JUSTICE BROKER, supra, at 156-57; HERBERT M. KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY: LAWYERS AND
NONLAWYERS AT WORK 201 (1998) [hereinafter KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY]; MATHER ET
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Proposals to enhance unrepresented civil litigants’ access to meaningful justice can be grouped into three sets. One set recommends that
courts do more to facilitate unrepresented litigants’ ability to handle their
cases themselves, such as by providing instructions, simplified forms, and
increased assistance from court personnel or volunteers.5 Another set of
proposals urges courts to provide alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”)

AL., supra, at 59. Unrepresented litigants also are more likely than represented litigants to
be “one-shotters” or “have nots” and, thus, might also lack other skills and resources. See,
e.g., Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, in IN LITIGATION: DO THE “HAVES” STILL COME OUT AHEAD? 13, 15, 22, 27
(Herbert M. Kritzer & Susan S. Silbey eds., 2003); Donald R. Songer et al., Do the “Haves”
Come Out Ahead over Time?, in IN LITIGATION: DO THE “HAVES” STILL COME OUT AHEAD?
85, 99, 102-103 (Herbert M. Kritzer & Susan S. Silbey eds., 2003).
4. GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 2, at 52-54; GREACEN, supra note 2, at 9-12; Beck
& Sales, supra note 2, at 993; Berenson, supra note 3, at 112-15; Paula Hannaford-Agor &
Nicole Mott, Research on Self-Represented Litigation: Preliminary Results and Methodological Considerations, 24 JUST. SYS. J. 163, 165 (2003); see generally BOSTON BAR ASS’N,
supra note 2; Richard Zorza, The Disconnect Between the Requirements of Judicial Neutrality and Those of the Appearance of Neutrality When Parties Appear Pro Se: Causes, Solutions, Recommendations, and Implications, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 423 (2004).
5. See, e.g., BOSTON BAR ASS’N, supra note 2, at 2; CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES &
CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADMINISTRATORS, RESOLUTION II: In Support of a Leadership
Role for CCJ and COSCA in the Development, Implementation and Coordination of Assistance Programs for Self-Represented Litigants (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter CCJ/COSCA],
available at http://cosca.ncsc.dni.us/Resolutions/CourtAdmin/resolutionSelfRepresented
Litigants.html; GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 2, at 25, 68-71; GREACEN, supra note 2, at
13; IOWA JUDGES ASS’N AND IOWA STATE BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE JOINT TASK FORCE ON
PRO SE LITIGATION 4-9 (2005) [hereinafter IOWA TASK FORCE], available at
http://www.iowabar.org/miscdocuments.nsf/2b85a4ea12f4bfac8625669d006e27ab/2255cb2
54c1954af8625701b0061fc6f/$FILE/Pro%20se%20task%20force%20june%202005.pdf;
MASS. ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM’N, BARRIERS TO ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN MASSACHUSETTS 45 (2007) [hereinafter MASS. COMMISSION], available at http://www.massaccesstojustice.org/
reports-of-the-commission.php; N.H. SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON SELFREPRESENTATION, CHALLENGE TO JUSTICE: A REPORT ON SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS IN
NEW HAMPSHIRE COURTS 13-18 (2004) [hereinafter N.H. TASK FORCE] available at
http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme/prosereport.pdf; SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGATION
NETWORK, BEST PRACTICES IN COURT-BASED PROGRAMS FOR THE SELF-REPRESENTED: CONCEPTS, ATTRIBUTES, AND ISSUES FOR EXPLORATION 3-18 (2006) [hereinafter SRLN], available at http://www.ncsonline.org/WC/Publications/KIS_ProseBestPracticesSRLN.pdf; Berenson, supra note 3, at 122-33; Chase, supra note 2, at 414-18. For empirical research on
the effectiveness of these programs, see GREACEN, supra note 2, at 13-28; Russell Engler,
Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data Reveal About When
Counsel is Most Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37, 81 (2010).
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programs, particularly mediation, for unrepresented litigants.6 The third set
of proposals focuses on increasing the availability of legal representation.7
Proposals to expand legal representation generally are silent as to whether they envision providing counsel for ADR proceedings. The ABA proposal does address this issue, but different positions are expressed in different documents. In the report accompanying the ABA resolution, the provision of counsel is limited to fora that occur in the “litigation context” and in
which the process is “adversarial.”8 In another document, however, the
recommendation is to provide “a full range of services in all forums” including, among others, “representation in negotiation and alternative dispute resolution.”9 Thus, the ABA proposal presumably includes providing
counsel for adversarial court-connected ADR proceedings like arbitration,
although it is not clear whether it extends to “non-adversarial” courtconnected ADR proceedings like mediation or neutral evaluation.10
6. See, e.g., BOSTON BAR ASS’N, supra note 2, at 2; MASS. COMM’N, supra note 5, at
64; N.H. TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 19-21; Chase, supra note 2, at 421-22. These proposals typically cite relaxed rules of evidence and procedure and a less formal setting among
the reasons why mediation would be a good forum for unrepresented litigants.
7. Many proposals in this third set aim to accomplish this through increased pro bono
work, the unbundling of legal services, or limited-purpose representation. See, e.g., BOSTON
BAR ASS’N, supra note 2, at 1; CCJ/COSCA, supra note 5; GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., supra note
2, at 70; IOWA TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 10-16; MASS. COMM’N, supra note 5, at 5-10;
N.H. TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 10-12; SRLN, supra note 5, at 20-25; Berenson, supra
note 3, at 122-33; Chase, supra note 1, at 415-19. By contrast, the ABA resolution that is
the subject of the present Symposium urges the provision of counsel “at public expense to
low income persons in those categories of adversarial proceedings where basic human needs
are at stake, such as those involving shelter, sustenance, safety, health or child custody. . . .”
ABA TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 1.
8. ABA TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 13. The ABA’s focus on providing counsel in
adversarial proceedings is consistent with Reuben’s discussion of litigants’ qualified right to
counsel in ADR, based on his review of Supreme Court decisions: “[a] right to counsel has
been held to be a requirement of due process when the hearing is of an adversarial nature . . .
but it has not been found to be essential in hearings that are nonadversarial in nature.” Reuben, supra note 3, at 1079.
9. ABA TASK FORCE ON ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF A STATE SYSTEM FOR THE DELIVERY OF CIVIL LEGAL AID 1 (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/
legalservices/sclaid/atjresourcecenter/downloads/tencivilprinciples.pdf.
10. And because the report specifically excludes providing counsel in processes designed primarily for use by unrepresented litigants, such as to resolve small claims and simple uncontested divorces, the ABA proposal presumably does not include providing counsel
for any ADR proceedings in those contexts. This apparently is based on the theory that
lawyers are often excluded from these fora or are not needed for litigants to “quickly and
effectively access legal rights and protections” because judges in these fora “take an active
role in developing the relevant facts.” ABA TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 13. Empirical
research in small claims and housing courts, however, raises serious questions about these
assumptions. See, e.g., LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR BETTER HOUSING, NO TIME FOR JUSTICE:
A STUDY OF CHICAGO’S EVICTION COURT 4 (2003), available at http://lcbh.org/images/
2008/10/chicago-eviction-court-study.pdf; Engler, supra note 5, at 50-51 & n.56; Roselle L.
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In practice, however, there is no distinct line between “adversarial” and
“non-adversarial” processes. Although the mediation process itself may be
considered non-adversarial, it often takes place in the middle of adversarial
litigation. In many courts, mandatory mediation is a formal step in the
court management of litigation;11 if the parties do not settle in mediation,
they are immediately back in the adversarial “litigotiation” process.12 Just
as there is no clear separation between negotiation and litigation, there is no
clear separation between mediation and either negotiation or litigation.13
The assumption that representation is not needed in mediation appears to
underlie proposals that exclude mediation from the processes for which
counsel should be provided, as well as proposals that urge courts to provide
mediation programs for unrepresented litigants. Existing mediation programs, however, do not necessarily share this assumption. Some courtconnected programs routinely exclude cases with unrepresented litigants
from mandatory referral to mediation, some refer only certain matters to
mediation when one or both parties are unrepresented, and some require
lawyers to accompany their clients in mediation.14 Other programs, however, have mandatory referral to mediation without regard to the parties’
representational status, and a few do not allow lawyers to attend mediation
or permit the mediator to exclude lawyers.15 Thus, different mediation
programs appear to have reached different conclusions about the relative
benefits and costs of representation versus lack of representation in mediation.
Wissler, Mediation and Adjudication in Small Claims Court: The Effects of Process and
Case Characteristics, 29 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 323, 323-24, 335-37 (1995).
11. See John Lande, How Will Lawyering and Mediation Transform Each Other?, 24
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 839 (1997) (describing the “liti-mediation” culture, where mediation is
routinely integrated into litigation practice); Craig A. McEwen & Roselle L. Wissler, Finding Out If It Is True: Comparing Mediation and Negotiation Through Research, 2002 J.
DISP. RESOL. 131, 132-33 (2002); Roselle L. Wissler, The Effectiveness of Court-Connected
Dispute Resolution in Civil Cases, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 55, 63, 72 (2004).
12. See Marc Galanter, Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation to Teach About the Legal
Process, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 268 (1984); HERBERT M. KRITZER, The Lawyer as Negotiator:
Working in the Shadows 2, 5, 15 (Univ. of Wis. Law Sch. Disputes Processing Research
Program: Series No. 7, Working Paper No. 4, 1986).
13. Lande, supra note 11; see also KRITZER, supra note 12, at 19; Jean R. Sternlight,
ADR Is Here: Preliminary Reflections on Where it Fits in a System of Justice, 3 Nev. L.J.
289, 294-95 (2003).
14. ROBERT J. NIEMIC ET AL., GUIDE TO JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT OF CASES IN ADR 40
(2001); see also infra Part I.A.
15. See infra Part I.A; see also Nancy A. Welsh, Stepping Back Through the Looking
Glass: Real Conversations with Real Disputants About Institutionalized Mediation and its
Value, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 573, 611 (2004) (describing a special education mediation program that permitted non-lawyer advocates to attend mediation but excluded lawyers).
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The concerns about unrepresented parties in mediation include many of
the same concerns that have been raised about unrepresented parties in litigation and negotiation,16 plus additional concerns specific to the mediation
process. Unrepresented parties might not understand how mediation operates, how it fits into the overall litigation process, or its potential advantages or disadvantages when deciding whether or how to use mediation.17 Unrepresented parties might not be able to articulate or express their views or
concerns during mediation.18 Mediators’ neutrality might be compromised
if unrepresented parties seek their advice or support: unrepresented parties
might feel the process is unfair if mediators do not assist them, and
represented parties might feel it is unfair if they do.19 Unrepresented parties might view the mediator as a court authority and feel pressured to settle, or they might think that being required to mediate means they are required to settle.20 Unrepresented parties also might not have enough factual or legal information to evaluate the implications of settlement proposals in order to make a fully informed decision and, as a consequence, might
accept a settlement that is unfair or does not adequately address their interests.21
The effect of the presence of lawyers on the mediation process and outcomes has been debated.22 Lawyers generally are thought to improve the
effectiveness of mediation and their clients’ mediation experience by preparing them for mediation and advising them on negotiation skills.23 Some
commentators argue that lawyers are essential to ensure the fairness of the
mediation process because they equalize power imbalances and counteract
settlement pressures; others maintain that mediators can, and in some set-

16. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
17. Ctr. for Dispute Settlement and Inst. for Judicial Admin., NAT’L STANDARDS FOR
COURT-CONNECTED MEDIATION PROGRAMS, § 1.4 & cmt. [hereinafter NAT’L STANDARDS],
available at courtadr.org/files/NationalStandardsADR.pdf; NIEMIC ET AL., supra note 14, at
56; Beck & Sales, supra note 2, at 992; Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in
Mediation: A Guiding Principle for Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 775, 778-80 (1999).
18. Beck & Sales, supra note 2, at 1001; Farley, supra note 3, at 569.
19. NIEMIC ET AL., supra note 14, at 24; Beck & Sales, supra note 2, at 1020. A similar
concern has been raised regarding judges’ impartiality with unrepresented litigants. GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 2, at 25-32; Zorza, supra note 4, at 423-25.
20. NAT’L STANDARDS, supra note 17, §§ 1.4, 11.1, 11.2 & cmts; NIEMIC ET AL., supra
note 14, at 56; Beck & Sales, supra note 2, at 1012.
21. NIEMIC ET AL., supra note 14, at 56; NAT’L STANDARDS, supra note 17 § 1.4 &
cmts.; Beck & Sales, supra note 2, at 993-94, 1012, 1039-40.
22. See, e.g., NAT’L STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 10.2 & cmt.; ALFINI ET AL., MEDIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE 412 (2001); Lande, supra note 11, at 890.
23. See infra Part I.B.1.
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tings have a duty to, address these problems.24 Some commentators argue
that lawyers are likely to dominate mediation sessions, thereby limiting the
parties’ direct participation and transforming their discussions; others
maintain that lawyers ensure that parties can communicate their concerns
and are not silenced by the mediator or the other side.25 Some argue that
lawyers make mediation more contentious and thereby reduce opportunities
for problem-solving and relationship repair; others maintain that lawyers
help keep the parties’ emotions in check and improve the tone of the session.26 There is also disagreement about whether lawyers increase or reduce the likelihood of settlement in mediation.27 While some commentators argue that lawyers ensure against uninformed or unfair agreements,
others maintain that mediators can help parties assess settlement proposals
and, in some settings, have a duty to prevent unfair settlements.28
Given the large proportion of unrepresented litigants and the widespread
use of court-connected mediation, it is important to understand what effect
representation, or conversely, the lack of representation, has on parties’
experiences in mediation as well as the process and its outcomes.29 To
date, few empirical studies have examined these questions.30 This Article
discusses the existing research findings and presents new data on the effect
of representation in mediation.31
This Article first describes the proportion of unrepresented parties in
mediation and the policies and practices regarding representation in different mediation contexts. The core of the Article examines the empirical
findings on the effect of representation on several dimensions of the mediation process, including the effect on preparation for mediation, party perceptions of the fairness of the process and pressures to settle, the extent of
party “voice” and participation in mediation, and the tone of the session. In
addition, the Article examines the effect of representation on mediation
outcomes, including the likelihood of settlement and the fairness of agree24. See infra Part I.B.2.
25. See infra Part I.B.3.
26. See infra Part I.B.4.
27. See infra Part I.C.1.
28. See infra Part I.C.2.
29. See also Beck & Sales, supra note 2, at 995.
30. See also Beck & Sales, supra note 2, at 993, 1039 (noting that “we have no information about whether having an attorney as an advisor has any bearing on . . . satisfaction levels” and “almost no research has been conducted that even mentions pro se litigants, much
less that assesses the effects of mediation on these litigants or the progress of their cases.”);
McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1391.
31. This Article focuses on the effect of having a representative in mediation when the
party attends mediation, not when the representative attends mediation instead of the party.
See, e.g., Leonard L. Riskin & Nancy A. Welsh, Is That All There Is?: “The Problem” in
Court-Oriented Mediation, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 863, 875-76, 894-95 (2008).
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ments reached. The studies find few differences consistently associated
with representation, suggesting that unrepresented parties might face fewer
problems in mediation—and lawyers might create fewer problems—than
some claim. The available research is too limited, however, to be able to
conclude that lawyers either play an essential role in mediation or are not
needed, or that they are particularly helpful or detrimental to the mediation
process. Additional findings show that how lawyers represent clients during mediation is related to parties’ assessments of mediation and settlement. The Article concludes with a discussion of the findings, the limitations of existing studies, and the additional research that is needed to inform policies and practices regarding representation in mediation.
I. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS REGARDING REPRESENTATION IN MEDIATION
This section of the Article presents the findings of the handful of studies
that have examined the effect of representational status in mediation, primarily in domestic relations and Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”)
cases. These findings are supplemented with new analyses of existing datasets involving court-connected domestic relations mediation and general
civil mediation, which will be referred to throughout as “the present study”
in domestic relations mediation and general civil mediation, respectively.32
Before the findings are presented, the methodology and context of these
two studies will be briefly discussed.
The findings of the “present study” of domestic relations mediation are
based on data collected as part of a study of mandatory mediation of contested cases involving children in thirteen district and superior courts in
Maine.33 All mediators,34 lawyers, and parties in cases mediated between
32. Most of these analyses are reported for the first time in this article; a few have previously been reported in Roselle L. Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation in General Civil
Cases: What We Know from Empirical Research, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 641 (2002)
[hereinafter Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation] and ROSELLE L. WISSLER, TRAPPING THE
DATA: AN ASSESSMENT OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS MEDIATION IN MAINE AND OHIO COURTS
(1999) [hereinafter WISSLER, TRAPPING THE DATA] (on file with author).
33. Mediation could resolve all contested issues, including property and financial issues.
The mediator reported to the court whether the case was resolved and, if not, which issues
remained and whether a hearing or an additional mediation session should be scheduled. If
the parties reached an agreement in mediation, a written agreement signed by the parties, or
one drafted by their lawyers, formed the basis of an uncontested hearing. If a full agreement
was not reached, the parties would have a hearing on the unresolved issues. For more information on the mediation program and study methodology, see WISSLER, TRAPPING THE DATA, supra note 32, at 1-16.
34. At that time, the parties paid $120 to the court to cover up to two mediation sessions; the court in turn paid the mediators, who served as independent contractors, a flat rate
of $50 per session. The mediators had a median of nine years of mediation experience, had
mediated a median of 300 domestic relations cases in the prior five years, and had com-
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February 1996 and March 1997 were asked to complete a questionnaire at
the end of the mediation session.35 The analyses reported here were conducted on the subset of 644 cases for which the questionnaires referred to
the final mediation session. Of the 849 parties, 84% had a lawyer; of those,
97% said their lawyer attended their mediation.36
The findings of the “present study” of general civil mediation are based
on data collected as part of a study of a pilot mediation program in the general division of five courts of common pleas in Ohio.37 All mediators,38
lawyers, and parties were asked to complete a questionnaire at the end of
the mediation session in a total of 688 cases mediated between 1997 and
1998 in three courts in the first phase of the pilot program, and in a total of
393 cases mediated between 1998 and 2000 in two courts in the second
phase of the program.39 Almost three-fourths of the cases were referred to
mediation by a judge, either at the request of one of the parties or on the
judge’s own initiative;40 the rest were randomly assigned to mediation. All
litigants were represented;41 accordingly, these data could not be used to
examine the effect of having a lawyer, but rather the effect of what the
lawyers did while representing clients in mediation. The descriptive findings presented here are the average for the five courts; the findings regardpleted a median of 106 hours of mediation training. The highest degree held by most of the
mediators (78%) was a bachelor’s or master’s degree; 7% had a law degree.
35. The overall response rate was 96% for mediators, 59% for parties, and 71% for lawyers. Whether parties completed a questionnaire was not related to mediator reports of
whether the case had settled.
36. Unless otherwise noted, parties whose lawyer did not attend mediation were combined with parties who did not have a lawyer for comparison with parties who had a lawyer
in mediation. It is the lawyer’s presence in or absence from the mediation session that is
thought to affect the mediation process and outcome on most dimensions. See infra Parts
I.B.2-4, C.1-2.
37. At that time, mediation was offered at no cost to the parties. There were no financial
penalties or disincentives for failure to reach a settlement, and the mediators reported to the
court only whether the case settled.
38. All mediators were lawyers and were employed by the courts as half-time or fulltime mediators. All mediators had over forty hours of general mediation training, and most
also had over forty hours of training specifically in the mediation of civil cases. Some mediators had substantial experience mediating other types of cases; others had less mediation
experience but had substantial civil litigation experience.
39. The mediators completed a questionnaire in each case included in the study. Depending on the court, from 155 to 622 parties completed a questionnaire (for a completion
rate of 77% to 87% in all but one court, where the rate was 49%). Between 169 to 619 lawyers per court completed a questionnaire (for a completion rate of 88% to 98% in all but one
court, where the rate was 50%). For the number of completed questionnaires and the response rate for each court, see Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation, supra note 32, at 703.
40. These two groups of cases could not be distinguished in the first phase courts; in the
second phase courts, about half of these cases were referred at party request.
41. Cases involving unrepresented litigants were excluded from the pilot mediation
program. See Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation, supra note 32, at 652 n.37.

WISSLER_AUTHOR

428

3/12/2010 1:55 PM

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XXXVII

ing the effect of what the lawyers did in mediation are the result of metaanalyses.42
A.

How Many Parties Are Unrepresented in Mediation?

Few mediation studies reported whether parties were represented or unrepresented. In those that did, the proportion of unrepresented parties varied by the type of case and the jurisdiction, in part reflecting differences in
policies regarding case eligibility for mediation and practices regarding
lawyers’ attendance at mediation. Because of these policies, the proportion
of unrepresented parties in mediation was likely to be smaller than in all
filed cases.
Across several studies of domestic relations mediation, the proportion of
cases in which both parties were unrepresented ranged from 3% to 33%,
and the proportion of cases in which only one party was unrepresented
ranged from 17% to 26%.43 Cases in court-connected mediation are likely
to involve fewer unrepresented parties than all filed divorce cases because
courts generally mandate mediation only in contested cases, and parties in
contested cases are less likely to be unrepresented.44 Whether lawyers accompany their clients to mediation depends on the policies and practices in
specific jurisdictions. Some courts prohibit the exclusion of lawyers from
mediation; others permit mediators to exclude lawyers from mediation or to
limit their participation during mediation.45 Even in jurisdictions where
lawyers may attend mediation, they often do not.46 Accordingly, in domes42. Meta-analysis takes into consideration the strength, direction, and degree of statistical significance of the effect found in each court and essentially averages the effects across
the courts, providing measures that indicate the overall strength and direction of the effect
(r) and its statistical significance (p). The meta-analytic methods used are those in ROBERT
ROSENTHAL, META-ANALYTIC PROCEDURES FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH 88-91 (4th prtg. 1989).
43. See, e.g., Beck & Sales, supra note 2, at 994; Joan B. Kelly, Family Mediation Research: Is There Empirical Support for the Field?, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 3, 6, 9-10
(2004); McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1359. In the present study, both parties were unrepresented in 10% of cases, and one party was unrepresented in 18%. See also CTR. FOR FAMILIES, CHILDREN & THE COURTS, DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS OF CLIENTS IN COURT-BASED CHILD
CUSTODY MEDIATION 3 (July 2005), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/
cfcc/pdffiles/SUSRSDemoTrends.pdf (finding that at least one parent was unrepresented in
69% of mediated cases in California in 2003).
44. McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1358, 1359 n.244, 1391.
45. SARAH R. COLE ET AL., MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE § 6:7 (2d ed. 2007-08
cumulative supplement issued in Dec. 2007); McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1331. Excluding lawyers from mediation, particularly when mediation is mandatory, is contrary to recommendations. See, e.g., UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT §10 (2001). See also Reuben, supra
note 3, at 1095-96 (arguing that statutes excluding counsel from court-connected mediation
would be unconstitutional); NAT’L STANDARDS, supra note 17, §§ 10.2, 11.3 & cmts.
46. See, e.g., McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1331, 1351-52; Suzanne Reynolds et al.,
Back to the Future: An Empirical Study of Child Custody Outcomes, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1629,
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tic relations mediation, there is not a simple distinction between
“represented” and “unrepresented” parties, but an additional intermediate
category of parties who have counsel but who do not have representation
within the mediation session itself.47 Some divorce mediation statutes or
court rules assign mediators the duty to warn parties of the risks of proceeding without counsel or to advise parties to seek independent legal advice or have a lawyer review settlement proposals before signing an agreement.48
Studies of Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) mediation showed
different patterns of the extent and type of representation in different settings. In a pilot mediation program involving several Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) offices, one party was unrepresented
in 33% of cases, and both parties were unrepresented in 45% of cases.49
Among represented parties, most charging parties and all responding parties were represented by a lawyer; the remaining charging parties had union
representation.50 In a transformative mediation program involving informal EEO complaints within the U.S. Postal Service, charging parties were
unrepresented in one-third of cases, and responding parties were unrepresented in two-thirds of cases.51 Among represented parties, only 5% of
charging parties and 3% of responding parties were represented by a lawyer; instead, they were primarily represented by a union representative or a
fellow employee.52 Thus, in EEO mediation, the distinction is not only
1634 (2007). For instance, although 89% of parties in a study of Ohio domestic relations
mediation had counsel, only 8% of those parties had a lawyer present during mediation.
WISSLER, TRAPPING THE DATA, supra note 32, at 57. Lawyers’ presence may depend, in
part, on whether financial and property issues are permitted to be addressed in mediation.
MATHER ET AL., supra note 3, at 75. But even within a state, lawyers’ attendance at mediation varied widely, from fewer than 10% of cases to 98% of cases. McEwen et al., supra
note 2, at 1331 n.72.
47. See also Hannaford-Agor & Mott, supra note 4, at 176.
48. McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1332-33, 1397-98, 1401-02, 1405-06, 1409.
49. CRAIG A. MCEWEN, AN EVALUATION OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION’S PILOT MEDIATION PROGRAM 43 (1994) (on file with author). When only one
party was represented, it was as likely to be the charging party as the responding party. Id.
at 50.
50. E-mail from Craig McEwen, Oct. 5, 2008 (on file with author).
51. Lisa B. Bingham et al., Exploring the Role of Representation in Employment Mediation at the USPS, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 341, 356, 364 (2002); Tina Nabatchi &
Lisa B. Bingham, Transformative Mediation in the USPS REDRESS Program: Observations
of ADR Specialists, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 399, 401-03 (2001).
52. Sixty-three percent of represented charging parties were represented by the union,
and 20% were represented by a fellow employee; 45% of represented responding parties
were represented by a fellow employee. Bingham et al., supra note 51, at 364. The rate of
legal representation in this setting might be lower because these were informal EEO complaints, in contrast to the formal complaints mediated in the EEOC offices in the McEwen
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between unrepresented and represented parties, but also between lawyer
and non-lawyer representatives.53
Studies of court-connected general civil mediation seldom report the
proportion of unrepresented litigants. Most programs exclude cases involving unrepresented parties from eligibility for mandatory referral to mediation54 and require lawyers to accompany their clients to mediation.55 Given
these policies, few unrepresented parties are likely to appear in general civil mediation;56 fewer than in all filed civil cases, and too few to allow us to
examine the effects of representation.
The reverse situation exists in small claims mediation: most cases involve two unrepresented parties, even though they have the right to retain
counsel in many jurisdictions.57 The proportion of unrepresented parties in
small claims mediation is likely to be smaller than that in all filed small
claims cases because mediation typically is available only in cases where
both parties appear on the date of trial,58 and unrepresented parties are less
likely than represented parties to appear in court to prosecute or defend the
case.59 There tend to be too few represented parties to be able to examine
the effects of representation in small claims mediation.
study. Cf. MCEWEN supra note 49. For other ways in which the USPS program differed
from other EEO mediation programs, see infra note 91.
53. This distinction also applies in special education mediation and perhaps in other
types of mediation as well. See Peter J. Kuriloff & Steven S. Goldberg, Is Mediation a Fair
Way to Resolve Special Education Disputes? First Empirical Findings, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 35, 55-56 (1997); Welsh, supra note 15.
54. ROBERT J. NIEMIC, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MEDIATION & CONFERENCE PROGRAMS IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND LAWYERS 5-6 (1997);
Wissler, supra note 11, at 71. Cases involving unrepresented parties might enter courtconnected mediation at the agreement of both parties, but their numbers are likely to be
small. A few mediation programs arrange pro bono limited purpose representation so that
otherwise unrepresented parties can participate in mediation. See, e.g., Joseph A. Torregrossa, Appellate Mediation in the Third Circuit – Program Operations: Nuts, Bolts and Practice Tips, 47 VILL. L. REV. 1059, 1080-81 (2002); see also NAT’L STANDARDS, supra note
17, §§ 1.4, 4.2(c) & cmts. (recommending that courts not exclude all unrepresented litigants
from mediation, but instead make a case-by-case determination of the parties’ ability to
negotiate effectively).
55. NIEMIC ET AL., supra note 14, at 56; Wissler, supra note 11, at 63, 72.
56. See e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyers’ Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using
Economics and Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting, 14 OHIO ST.
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 269, 277 (1999) (citing survey results that 75% of responding Florida
courts reported that lawyers were present in all civil mediation sessions, and the remaining
courts reported that lawyers were present in most sessions); Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation, supra note 32, at 657 (lawyers were present at mediation in virtually every case).
57. Wissler, supra note 11, at 56.
58. Id. at 56-57.
59. See Suzanne E. Elwell & Christopher D. Carlson, The Iowa Small Claims Court: An
Empirical Analysis, 75 IOWA L. REV. 433, 443, 511 (1990).
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What Effect Does Representation Have on the Mediation Process?
1.

Does Representation Enhance Party Preparation for Mediation?

For parties’ participation in mediation to be informed and for the mediation process and outcome to be fair, parties need to understand what is likely to happen during the mediation process, what the role of the mediator is,
and that they can terminate mediation at any time.60 Parties who are more
prepared for mediation are generally thought to have a better experience
and a more productive session, and represented parties are presumed to be
better prepared for mediation than unrepresented parties.61
Little is known about unrepresented parties’ understanding of the mediation process, the role of the mediator, or how mediation fits into the larger
litigation context. Charging parties in EEO mediation, most of whom were
unrepresented, often had unrealistic expectations about the process and
possible outcomes.62 Parents interviewed before they participated in special education mediation hoped that the mediator would, among other
things, do the talking for them and persuade school officials to consider
their views.63 Few of the parents were prepared to suggest or explore solu60. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 17, at 778-80; see also ABA MODEL STANDARDS OF
PRACTICE FOR FAMILY AND DIVORCE MEDIATION, Standard III.A (2001) [hereinafter ABA
MODEL DIVORCE MEDIATION STANDARDS], available at http://www.afccnet.org/pdfs/
modelstandards.pdf; NAT’L STANDARDS, supra note 17, §§ 1.4, 3.1, 3.2, 11.2 & cmts.; ALFINI ET AL., supra note 22, at 430; Welsh, supra note 15, at 657-58.
61. See, e.g., ABA SECTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION TASK FORCE ON IMPROVING MEDIATION QUALITY, FINAL REPORT 10-11 (2008) [hereinafter MEDIATION QUALITY], available at
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/documents/FinalTaskForceMediation.pdf (reporting that
experienced commercial mediation users consistently stressed the importance of lawyer and
client preparation for mediation); HAROLD I. ABRAMSON, MEDIATION REPRESENTATION:
ADVOCATING IN A PROBLEM-SOLVING PROCESS 159-60 (2004); ALFINI ET AL., supra note 22,
at 430; COLE ET AL., supra note 45, at §§ 4:10-11; JULIE MACFARLANE, THE NEW LAWYER:
HOW SETTLEMENT IS TRANSFORMING THE PRACTICE OF LAW 146 (2008); Tom Arnold, 20
Common Errors in Mediation Advocacy, 13 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIGATION 69, 70 (1995); Beck & Sales, supra note 2, at 1000, 1039; Donald T. Saposnek, Commentary: The Future of the History of Family Mediation Research, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q.
37, 40-41 (2004); Mark S. Umbreit et al., Victim-Offender Mediation: Three Decades of
Practice and Research, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 279, 284-85 (2004); Welsh, supra note 15,
at 657-58. See generally Frank V. Ariano, A Lawyer’s Guide to Preparing Clients for
Family Law Mediation, 90 ILL. B.J. 600 (2002); Shelby R. Grubbs, Preparing for Mediation: An Advocate’s Checklist, 32 TENN. B.J. 14 (Mar./Apr. 1996).
62. MCEWEN, supra note 49, at 61-62. One of the study’s recommendations was that
the EEOC develop “informational materials about the EEOC process and about mediation
that would permit charging parties to make informed decisions about how to proceed with
their charges and to have more realistic expectations when they do so.” Id. at 81.
63. Welsh, supra note 15, at 621-22. These findings are based on pre-mediation interviews with parents in fourteen cases mediated during a two-month period in 2000. Id. at
607-11. None of the parents were represented in mediation by a lawyer; two were
represented by a lay advocate. Id.
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tions other than those they had already proposed; most seemed to hope that
school officials would simply accept their demands upon gaining a better
understanding of their child during mediation.64 In addition, what parties
do to learn about and prepare for mediation has seldom been explored. In
domestic relations mediation, 38% of unrepresented parties read a courtprovided brochure about mediation, 24% spoke to someone from the court
about mediation, and 20% gathered information about mediation on their
own.65
Having a lawyer is no guarantee that parties will receive information
about and preparation for mediation. Only 44% of parties in one domestic
relations study met with their lawyer to talk about mediation before the first
session.66 In another study, represented parties often had “profound misconceptions” about the goals of divorce mediation.67 Almost half of
represented parties interviewed in a study of general civil mediation felt illprepared for mediation and uncertain about what to expect.68 Many parties
said preparation by their lawyer consisted of a brief discussion just before
the mediation session; others received no preparation at all.69 By contrast,
most parties in the present study of general civil mediation received preparation for mediation from their lawyers: 57% received considerable preparation and 37% received some preparation. Only 6% received little or no
preparation.
The amount of preparation parties received from their lawyers70 was uniformly and favorably related to parties’ and lawyers’ assessments of medi-

64. See id. at 627-28.
65. WISSLER, TRAPPING THE DATA, supra note 32 (based on new analyses of only unrepresented parties in the Ohio dataset). Parties were asked to check every action they took;
some engaged in several of these actions. Interestingly, represented parties were equally
likely to engage in these actions.
66. Id. Whether parties met with their lawyer prior to mediation was not related to their
assessments of mediation or to settlement. Id. at 83, 92. In these courts, lawyers generally
did not attend mediation. Id. at 57.
67. Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Divorce Mediation: An Overview of Research
Results, 19 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 451, 466 (1985).
68. Julie Macfarlane & Michaela Keet, Civil Justice Reform and Mandatory Civil Mediation in Saskatchewan: Lessons from a Maturing Program, 42 ALBERTA L. REV. 677, 692
(2005). These findings are based on focus groups with thirty-one parties and interviews with
eight institutional parties. Id. at 686.
69. MACFARLANE, supra note 61, at 204. Lawyers themselves sometimes are not prepared for mediation. See Craig A. McEwen et al., Lawyers, Mediation, and the Management
of Divorce Practice, 28 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 149, 159 (1994) (finding that 39% of divorce
lawyers reported other lawyers were only “sometimes” or “rarely” well prepared for mediation).
70. Parties were asked to rate “Prior to the mediation, did your lawyer help you prepare
for the mediation process?” on a five-point scale, from “not at all” to “a great deal.” Law-
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ation71 in the present study of general civil mediation (see Table 1).72 Parties who had more preparation for mediation, compared to parties with less
preparation, thought that the mediation process was more fair; that they had
more chance to tell their views and more input into the outcome; and that
the mediator was more impartial, understood their views better, and treated
them with more respect.73 Notably, parties who had more preparation felt
less pressured to settle than did parties who had less preparation. In addition, parties who received more preparation for mediation were more likely
to settle and were more likely to think the settlement was fair.74

yers were asked to rate “Did you prepare your client for the mediation session?” on the same
scale.
71. Parties and lawyers rated the mediator and the mediation process on a number of
dimensions, each on a five-point scale from “not at all” to “a great deal.”
72. To determine whether an observed relationship between two measures is a “true”
relationship (or whether an observed difference between two or more groups is a “true”
difference) or merely reflects chance variation, tests of statistical significance must be conducted. The conventional level of probability for determining the statistical significance of
findings is the .05 level (i.e., p < .05). The correlation coefficient (r) indicates the strength
and direction of the relationship, and ranges from +1.00 to -1.00, with .00 indicating no
relationship between the measures. Cramer’s V provides a measure of the strength of the
effect for chi-square (χ2) analyses. See RICHARD P. RUNYON & AUDREY HABER, FUNDAMENTALS OF BEHAVIORAL STATISTICS 140-142, 230 (5th ed. 1984).
73. Perhaps these relationships were relatively small because of variation in the content
of the preparation received. For the components of mediation preparation that parties and
lawyers think are helpful, see MEDIATION QUALITY, supra note 61, at 10-11; Macfarlane &
Keet, supra note 68, at 693; see also, e.g., ALFINI ET AL., supra note 22, at 430; JOHN W.
COOLEY, MEDIATION ADVOCACY 49-50, 92-93 (2d ed. 2002); Arnold, supra note 61, at 70.
In addition, parties in commercial mediation who felt their lawyers had better prepared them
for mediation were more satisfied with their lawyers, and some reported making subsequent
hiring decisions based on how much their lawyers had prepared for mediation. MEDIATION
QUALITY, supra note 61, at 10-11.
74. Settlement, r = .115, p < .01. See also Julie Macfarlane, Culture Change? A Tale of
Two Cities and Mandatory Court-Connected Mediation, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 241, 261 n.79
(2002) (reporting that several empirical studies found lack of preparation to be an important
reason for failing to settle in mediation).
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Table 1. Relationships Between the Amount of Party Preparation and
Parties’ and Lawyers’ Assessments of General Civil Mediation
Parties’ Assessments
Fair process

.159***

Treated with respect

.097***

Mediator was impartial

.115***

Not pressured by mediator .067**

Chance to tell views

.164***

Not pressured by other
side

Input into outcome

.155***

Understood other’s views .074**

Mediator understood
views

.150***

Understood own case

.144***

Recommend mediation

.105***

Satisfaction with process

.105***

Fair settlement

.087*

.064*

Lawyers’ Assessments
Fair process

.134***

Mediator effective

.105***

Mediator impartial

.101***

Parties’ relationship

.084***

Party involvement

.155***

Timely issue definition

.124***

Recommend mediation

.181***

Evaluate other’s case

.118***

Fair settlement

.069+

Evaluate own case

.144***

Notes: Positive Pearson correlation coefficients indicate that more preparation is associated
with more favorable assessments.
+
p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

Lawyers who engaged in more client preparation for mediation also had
consistently more favorable assessments of mediation than lawyers who did
less client preparation in the present general civil mediation study (see Table 1). For instance, lawyers who did more client preparation thought that
mediation was more fair, allowed more party involvement in resolving the
case, and was more helpful in defining the issues and evaluating both their
client’s and the other side’s case.
Getting other forms of information or assistance before mediation, however, seemed to be associated with less favorable views of mediation and a
lower rate of settlement. Cases in domestic relations mediation were less
likely to settle if one or both parties had gathered information about mediation on their own (46%) or had talked with someone from the court about
mediation (41%) than if neither party had done so (61% and 68%, respec-
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tively).75 Parties who took these actions also tended to have less favorable
assessments of mediation.76 Similarly, in EEO cases, charging parties who
had sought assistance prior to mediation were less likely to settle in mediation than were parties who had not sought assistance.77 Getting premediation information or assistance might be expected to be helpful or to
have no effect;78 it is not clear why it seems to have had negative effects.
Perhaps these findings reflect the nature of the information the parties received, but they may say more about the parties or the cases in which they
are motivated to seek additional information.79
In sum, parties often had inaccurate and unrealistic expectations about
mediation. Although unrepresented parties sometimes sought out information about mediation, this was not necessarily helpful. Represented parties
were not always better informed about mediation, as their lawyers often did
not prepare them for the process. The more preparation lawyers gave their
clients, however, the more favorable the parties’ assessments of mediation
and the more likely the case was to settle.
2.

Does Representation Enhance the Fairness of the Mediation Process
and Reduce Pressures to Settle?

Process fairness, mediator impartiality, lack of coercion, and party selfdetermination are among the most fundamental principles of mediation.80
75. WISSLER, TRAPPING THE DATA, supra note 32, at 83. These findings include both
represented and unrepresented parties. Reading a court-provided brochure about mediation
was not related to settlement. Id.
76. Id. at 93. Reading a court-provided brochure was not related to parties’ assessments.
Id.
77. Thirty-one percent and over 52%, respectively. MCEWEN, supra note 49, at 43,
n.12.
78. Divorce education classes, offered in some jurisdictions prior to mediation though
not designed specifically as preparation for mediation, have been found to help improve
parties’ communication skills and to reduce conflict, which in turn could make their subsequent discussions in mediation more productive. Saposnek, supra note 61. Prior to victimoffender mediation, mediators or program staff typically meet separately with each party,
leading most parties to feel adequately prepared for mediation and enhancing the success of
mediation. Umbreit et al., supra note 61, at 285.
79. MCEWEN, supra note 49, at 43 n.12.
80. See, e.g., MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, §§ I.A, II, VI.A (Am.
Arb. Ass’n et al. 2005) [hereinafter AAA MODEL STANDARDS], available at
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/documents/model_standards_conduct_april2007.pdf; ABA
MODEL DIVORCE MEDIATION STANDARDS, supra note 60, §§ I, IV; MODEL RULE FOR THE
LAWYER AS THIRD-PARTY NEUTRAL, R. 4.5.3, 4.5.6 & cmts. (CPR-Georgetown Comm’n on
Ethics and Standards in ADR) [hereinafter MODEL RULE FOR NEUTRALS]; NAT’L STANDARDS, supra note 17, §§ 8.1.f, 11.1 & cmts.; Nolan-Haley, supra note 17, at 787; Leonard
Riskin, Toward New Standards for the Neutral Lawyer in Mediation, 26 ARIZ. L. REV. 329,
349, 354 (1984); Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-
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Procedural justice research has shown that these dimensions are interrelated: parties’ sense that they have control over the process and outcome
and that they have received even-handed, considered, and respectful treatment by the third party contributes to their views that the process is fair.81
Some commentators argue that lawyers increase fairness in mediation by
protecting their clients against mediator pressure as well as the opposing
side’s unfair bargaining advantages.82 Others suggest that lawyers might
not be needed because mediators can, and in some jurisdictions are required to, ensure the fairness of the process by addressing power imbalances between the parties and by remaining impartial and not exerting pressure on the parties; some, however, question whether mediators can fulfill
these duties.83
Several studies found that representation had no effect on parties’ assessments of the fairness of the mediation process. Two EEO mediation
studies found no relationship between representation in mediation and parties’ views of fairness.84 In the present domestic relations mediation study,
Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization? 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.
1, 15, 78-84 (2001).
81. See infra Part I.B.3 (discussing “voice” and participation). See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND
& TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 104, 214 (1988); Tom
R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW
65, 75-76 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2000); Nourit Zimerman & Tom R.
Tyler, Between Access to Counsel and Access to Justice: A Psychological Perspective, 37
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 473, 482-84 (2010); Wissler, supra note 10, at 346.
82. See, e.g., MACFARLANE, supra note 61, at 216-18; E. Patrick McDermott & Danny
Ervin, The Influence of Procedural and Distributive Variables on Settlement Rates in Employment Discrimination Mediation, 2005 J. DISP. RESOL. 45, 59 (2005); McEwen et al.,
supra note 2, at 1327, 1348, 1360-61, 1376; Reuben, supra note 3, at 1098; Kenneth K.
Stuart & Cynthia A. Savage, The Multi-Door Courthouse: How It’s Working, 26 COLO.
LAW. 13, 15 (1997).
83. See, e.g., AAA MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 80, § VI; ABA MODEL DIVORCE
MEDIATION STANDARDS, supra note 60, §§ XI, 25.4 (“[A] family mediator shall suspend or
terminate the mediation process when the mediator reasonably believes that a participant is
unable to effectively participate.”); MODEL RULE FOR NEUTRALS, supra note 80, R. 4.5.3,
4.5.6 & cmts; McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1325-26, 1332-34; 1397-98, 1405-06.
84. MCEWEN, supra note 49, at 57, 59 (finding that neither charging parties’ nor responding parties’ views of fairness were related to whether neither, one, or both parties were
represented; 92% of all parties thought the mediation process was fair). Most of the
represented parties were represented by lawyers. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
This study’s findings are based on information from charge records completed by mediators
and questionnaires completed by 204 charging parties and 216 responding parties following
the mediation of 267 claims in 1993-1994. These claims were mediated as part of a voluntary pilot program in four EEOC field offices, in which mediation was arranged by EEOC
staff and conducted by private mediators who did not report the mediation discussions to the
EEOC. MCEWEN, supra note 49, at 4-6, 18, n.5. If the parties did not reach complete
agreement in mediation, the charging party was free to continue the EEOC process; if an
agreement was reached, the EEOC would review it “to insure that it did not compromise the
statutory rights of the charging party.” Id. at 6. Arup Varma & Lamont E. Stallworth, Par-
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whether parties had a lawyer in mediation was not related to whether they
felt the process was fair.85 Nor was the combined representational status of
both parties (i.e., whether neither party, mother only, father only, or both
were represented) related to parties’ views of fairness.86 Perhaps the effect
of representation was muted in this study because mediators evened out
bargaining imbalances: mediators were more likely to say they “tried to
even out bargaining imbalances” when only one party had a lawyer present
(100%) than when neither (93%) or both (86%) parties had lawyers
present.87
Some might argue that these studies found no effect of representation
because unrepresented parties were unaware of what constitutes unfair procedures, and thus rated “objectively unfair” processes as fair.88 In the
present domestic relations and general civil mediation studies, however,
parties rated the mediation process as less fair than their lawyers did,89
suggesting that parties did not have overly favorable assessments. Regardless of their “objective accuracy,” parties’ assessments of process fairness
are considered important measures of the quality of dispute resolution procedures and are related to parties’ compliance with agreements as well as
their views of the legal system and its legitimacy.90
ticipants’ Satisfaction with EEO Mediation and the Issue of Legal Representation: An Empirical Study, 6 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 387, 403, tbl.3, 410 (2002) (finding no differences in fairness ratings between unrepresented and lawyer-represented parties). This
study’s findings are based on questionnaires completed by twenty-five parties whose EEO
disputes had gone through voluntary mediation conducted by a mediation service provider
for the Kansas Human Rights Commission. Id. at 395-98. This small sample size can make
it difficult to find statistically significant differences. See RUNYON & HABER, supra note 72,
at 345-46. However, the lack of differences on this particular measure is not due to the
small sample; the mean ratings of the two groups are identical (3.55 on a five-point scale).
85. Fifty-seven percent of parties thought the mediation process was very fair and 35%
thought it was somewhat fair; only 7% thought it was somewhat or very unfair.
86. Where possible, the effect of representation was examined both at the level of the
individual party and at the case level (i.e., the combined representational status of both parties) in the present domestic relations study. Analyses at the individual level tell us only
how parties’ views are affected by whether they have representation, without regard to
whether the other party is represented. Most studies have examined the effect of representation only at the individual party level.
87. χ2(2) = 14.81, p < .01, V =.10. Given that virtually all parties thought the mediators
were neutral, whatever the mediators did to try to even out bargaining imbalances apparently did not lead parties to view them as favoring one side or the other.
88. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, The Quality of Dispute Resolution Procedures and Outcomes: Measurement Problems and Possibilities, 66 DENV. U. L. REV. 419, 432-33 (1989).
89. Domestic relations: female parties, t(277) = 6.92, p < .001; male parties, t(248) =
8.29, p < .001. For civil mediation, see Wissler, supra note 32, at 663.
90. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 81, at 64-83, 208-11; Neil Vidmar, Procedural Justice and Alternative Dispute Resolution, in PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 121, 132 (Klaus F. Röhl &
Stefan Machura eds., 1997); Robert A. Baruch Bush, Defining Quality in Dispute Resolu-
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In contrast to the preceding studies, two other studies found that legal
representation was related to parties’ assessments of fairness, and that different representatives had different effects on fairness. The first study,
which involved the mediation of informal EEO complaints,91 found that
charging parties were more likely to be “very satisfied with the fairness of
the mediation process” when they were unrepresented than when they were
represented by a lawyer, but that the opposite was true for responding parties.92 Charging parties were less likely to be “very satisfied” with mediation’s fairness when they were represented by a lawyer than by other types
of representatives, but the reverse was true for represented responding parties. 93 Thus, lawyers had a different effect on the fairness assessments of
charging parties than responding parties, and lawyers had a different effect
than other types of representatives.
These findings suggest that it was not representation per se, nor legal representation, that affected parties’ views of process fairness. Rather, perhaps something about the way in which the different types of representatives conducted their representation led parties to see the mediation process
as more or less fair. Although the researchers did not examine whether
differences existed in how the different types of representatives actually
tion: Taxonomies and Anti-Taxonomies of Quality Arguments, 66 DENV. U. L. REV. 335,
348-51 (1989); Riskin, supra note 80, at 356-57; Tyler & Lind, supra note 81, at 71, 74.
91. See generally Bingham et al., supra note 51. This study’s findings are based on
7,651 mediator case reports and exit surveys completed by 7,989 complainants and 6,794
respondents following the voluntary mediation of EEO complaints within the USPS over
several years. Id. at 355-65. This program differed from other EEO mediation programs in
a number of ways that could have resulted in different effects of representation: the setting
(operated by the employer), the mix of cases (“informal” EEO complaints), the type of mediation (transformative), the mandatory participation of responding parties, the speed with
which cases entered mediation (within several weeks), the types of representatives (primarily non-lawyers), the fact that the responding parties who attended mediation were the subject of the complaint, and the fact that lawyers for responding parties were provided at no
cost. See id.; Lisa B. Bingham, Mediating Employment Disputes: Perceptions of Redress at
the United States Postal Service, 17 REV. PUB. PERSONNEL ADMIN. 20, 23 (1997); Lisa B.
Bingham & Mikaela Cristina Novac, Mediation’s Impact on Formal Discrimination Complaint Filing: Before and After the Redress Program at the U.S. Postal Service, 21 REV.
PUB. PERSONNEL ADMIN. 308, 310 (2001); Nabatchi & Bingham, supra note 51, at 403. In
addition, the study’s very large sample size would make it easier to find statistically significant differences. See RUNYON & HABER, supra note 72, at 345-46.
92. Bingham et al., supra note 51, at 367. Among charging parties, 67% of those who
were unrepresented and 46% who were represented by a lawyer were “very satisfied” with
the fairness of the mediation process. Id. at 368. Among responding parties, 72% of those
who were unrepresented and 81% represented by a lawyer were “very satisfied.” Id. at 370.
93. Among charging parties, 63% of those represented by the union and 62%
represented by a co-worker were “very satisfied” with the fairness of the mediation process.
Id. at 368. Among responding parties, 68% of those represented by a co-worker and 64% of
those with an association representative were “very satisfied.” Id. at 370. See supra note 92
for the ratings of parties who were represented by lawyers.
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handled cases in mediation,94 they did note several characteristics on which
the representatives differed that might have affected how they represented
clients in mediation. For instance, lawyers for charging parties had less
experience with transformative mediation, less knowledge of the workplace
setting and policies, and preferences that were less closely aligned with
those of their clients than did lawyers for responding parties and other representatives.95 As a result, lawyers for charging parties might have
represented their clients in a different way during mediation, which in turn
led their clients to see the process as less fair.96
The second study, which involved special education mediation, found
that unrepresented parents and parents with non-lawyer advocates thought
the mediation process was less fair than did parents who had lawyers.97
These findings might differ from those of other studies because of differences in the mediation context or the study methodology.98 For example,
94. See, e.g., Macfarlane, supra note 74, at 253-60 (identifying five “ideal types” of
mediation practice that reflected what lawyers sought to achieve in mediation, what approach they used during the session, and how they viewed their clients’ role in mediation);
see also Karl Monsma & Richard Lempert, The Value of Counsel: 20 Years of Representation Before a Public Housing Eviction Board, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 627, 658-59 (1992)
(finding that lawyers used several different styles when representing clients in public housing eviction hearings); Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Nancy Mills, What Family Lawyers Are
Really Doing When They Negotiate, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 612, 612-16 (2006) (finding that
lawyers’ negotiation behavior could be categorized into several different styles).
95. See Bingham et al., supra note 51, at 353-55, 366, 372-75.
96. Id. at 374; see also KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY, supra note 3, at 108, 170, 195
(finding that familiarity and experience with the specific procedure and setting, plus knowledge of past practices and ongoing relationships, were important factors in representatives’
effectiveness in hearings in various settings); infra notes 128-31 and accompanying text
(discussing how possible differences in style of representation might have affected parties’
satisfaction with their level of participation).
97. Kuriloff & Goldberg, supra note 53, at 55. Parents were given the option to mediate
when they requested a due process hearing; if they did not settle in mediation, they proceeded to a formal hearing. Id. at 45. Questionnaires were completed by parents who had
gone to mediation in 1987-1988. Id. at n.58. The analyses examining the effect of representation on parents’ views included only cases that settled and were based on twenty-three to
thirty-eight responses, depending on the measure. See id. at 55-56. The researchers combined unrepresented parents and parents represented by non-lawyer advocates into a single
group for most analyses. See id.
98. For example, this study used a “process fairness” scale comprised of nineteen items,
some of which might have tapped different aspects of parties’ views and, thus, produced
different responses than the single measures used in other studies. For example, some of the
items in this scale were whether the parties gave up more than they wanted to, whether they
felt pressured to settle, whether they could express their views, and whether the process was
impartial. Id. at 47. The fact that this study examined the views of only parties who settled
in mediation does not seem to explain why it found an effect of representation. In the
present domestic relations mediation study, when the responses of only parties who settled
were analyzed, there still was no effect of representation on parties’ views of process fairness or mediator neutrality.
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the impact of having a lawyer might have been greater in this study because
the opposing party always was represented by a lawyer,99 which was less
often the case in the other contexts. Importantly, parties who thought their
representative (lawyer or lay advocate) was more “effective” thought the
mediation process was more fair.100 This latter finding lends additional
support to the notion that characteristics of the representatives or how they
conduct their representation affects parties’ assessments of mediation.101
With regard to other party perceptions, namely settlement pressure and
mediator neutrality, the present domestic relations mediation study generally found that representation had no effect. Whether parties did or did not
have a lawyer in mediation was not related to whether they felt pressured to
settle; nor was the combined representational status of both parties related
to their feeling pressured to settle. Overall, 6% of parties felt pressured to
settle by the mediator, 13% felt pressured by the other side, and 6% felt
pressured by their own lawyer.102 In addition, whether parties had a lawyer
in mediation did not affect whether they thought the mediator was neutral.103 When looking at the parties’ combined representational status, female parties’ views of mediator neutrality did not vary, but male parties
were more likely to think the mediator favored them when they alone were
represented.104
Representation appeared to affect another aspect of domestic relations
mediation that could have implications for parties’ perceptions of settlement pressure and process fairness, even though it did not in the present
study. Mediators were less likely to say they used domestic violence protocols when neither party had a lawyer present in mediation (74%) than in

99. Id. at 56.
100. Id. at 57-58. This was true both for parents (r = .40) and for school officials (r =
.33). The “effectiveness of advocate” scale was comprised of eleven items, including
whether parties thought their representative helped them get their story out, helped balance
power, was knowledgeable about the relevant law, and was a source of support. Id. at 47.
101. See also E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants’ Evaluations
of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 953, 969, 972
(1990) (finding that, in a variety of dispute resolution processes other than mediation, parties’ evaluations of their lawyers’ knowledge of the facts of the case and their trust that their
lawyers would make decisions in their best interest were strongly related to procedural fairness judgments).
102. See also MACFARLANE, supra note 61, at 219 (reporting that among cases in which
parties sought to overturn mediated settlements on the basis of duress, many more were the
result of pressure by their lawyer rather than pressure by the mediator); Howard Erlanger et
al., Participation and Flexibility in Informal Processes: Cautions From the Divorce Context, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 585, 591, 593 (1987) (reporting that parties in bilateral negotiations felt settlement pressure from their lawyers).
103. Ninety-seven percent of parties thought the mediator was neutral.
104. F(3,360) = 3.91, p < .01.
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cases where one (81%) or both (88%) parties had lawyers in mediation.105
Perhaps the mere presence of a lawyer prompted the mediators to use the
domestic violence protocols, or perhaps the lawyers brought up the issue of
abuse, leading the mediators to inquire further about it. The parties’ representational status did not affect whether the mediators conducted mediation
in the usual way or used alternate procedures, such as separating the parties, upon learning of abuse. The presence of domestic violence was not
related to parties’ views of mediation fairness, mediator impartiality, or
settlement pressure.106 Nonetheless, these findings suggest that lack of representation may make it less likely that mediators will learn of abuse.
In sum, there were no differences between represented and unrepresented parties in whether they felt pressured to settle or thought the mediator was neutral. Three studies found no differences between represented
and unrepresented parties in their assessments of the fairness of the mediation process. Two studies found differences, but there was no consistent
pattern as to whether unrepresented parties thought the process was more or
less fair than parties represented by a lawyer. Nor were lawyers consistently associated with greater fairness than other types of representatives. The
way in which lawyers represented clients in mediation appeared to play a
role in parties’ views of process fairness.
3.

Does Representation Enhance or Limit Party Participation and
Expression of Views?

Direct party participation is a key distinguishing feature of mediation
and is thought to enhance parties’ understanding of the other side’s views
and facilitate agreements that meet the parties’ interests.107 Some commentators are concerned that lawyers’ presence in mediation will limit parties’
direct communication and will inhibit or transform their discussion of feelings, issues, and solutions; others argue that lawyers’ presence is critical to
105. χ2(2) = 9.69, p < .01, V = .133. This difference was not because abused parties were
more likely to be represented; there was no relationship between representation and parties’
reports of the existence of physical violence or its recency, frequency, or severity.
106. In the present study, parties in cases involving domestic violence could be exempted
from mandatory mediation; thus, most cases involving serious violence probably were not
referred to mediation. Twenty-nine percent of parties in mediation reported physical violence during their marriage; most of these said the violence was not recent, frequent, or
severe. If more cases with serious violence had been in mediation, the findings might have
been different.
107. See, e.g., NAT’L STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 1.7 cmt.; ABRAMSON, supra note 61,
at 187-88; JAY FOLBERG & ALISON TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITHOUT LITIGATION 10 (1984); Riskin & Welsh, supra note 31, at
897-99; Sternlight, supra note 56, at 273-74, 332-33, 336; Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals
in Court-Connected Mediation: What’s Justice Got to Do with It? 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 787,
794-95 (2001).
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ensuring that parties’ views are fully expressed and considered.108 There is
a range of views about how active a role lawyers should play in mediation,
from speaking as little as possible to speaking as much as they would in
bilateral negotiation or trial.109 Others suggest that the appropriate role of
lawyers in mediation depends on the nature of the case and the needs and
preferences of the client.110
Procedural justice research has clearly shown that process control or
“voice”—having the opportunity to present one’s evidence and express
one’s views—is critical to parties’ sense that the process is fair.111 But few
procedural justice studies—and none in the mediation context, with its
greater emphasis on and expectation of direct party participation—have
examined whether parties’ perception of voice is different when parties
express their views directly versus indirectly through a representative.112
The only study to examine parties’ post-experience assessments113 found
that unrepresented parties felt they had a somewhat greater opportunity to
express their views than did represented parties.114

108. See, e.g., Beck & Sales, supra note 2, at 1000; Lande, supra note 11, at 892, 894;
McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1327, 1354-55, 1364, 1371-74; Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley,
Lawyers, Clients, and Mediation, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1369, 1380-81 (1998); Tamara
Relis, “It’s Not About the Money!”: A Theory on Misconceptions of Plaintiffs’ Litigation
Aims, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 701, 726-27 (2007); Sternlight, supra note 56, at 274, 345-48,
356; Stuart & Savage, supra note 82, at 15; Welsh, supra note 107, at 787, 802-03. See generally Riskin & Welsh, supra note 31.
109. See, e.g., ABRAMSON, supra note 61, at 1, 191, 253; Arnold, supra note 61, at 69;
Reuben, supra note 3, at 1096; Riskin & Welsh, supra note 31, at 919-21; Sternlight, supra
note 56, at 270, 274-89, 345-49, 356-57.
110. See, e.g., ABRAMSON, supra note 61, at 186, 192; COOLEY, supra note 73, at 95;
Sternlight, supra note 56, at 348-49, 355-67.
111. LIND & TYLER supra note 81, at 101-06, 215; Tyler & Lind, supra note 81, at 70;
Wissler, supra note 10, at 345-46.
112. Tyler & Zimerman, supra note 81, at 493-94; Welsh, supra note 107, at 841.
113. Two studies examined pre-experience views by asking students to indicate what
procedure they thought they would prefer to use to resolve a hypothetical dispute. One
study found respondents preferred a procedure in which they could present the evidence
themselves; the other study found no appreciable differences but a slight preference for
procedures in which a representative would present the evidence. See Stephen LaTour et al.,
Procedure: Transnational Perspectives and Preferences, 86 YALE L.J. 258, 278 (1976);
Donna Shestowsky, Procedural Preferences in Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Closer,
Modern Look at an Old Idea, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 211, 243-44 (2004). These
findings, however, might not shed light on parties’ post-experience views of representation,
as research has found that the cognitive processes used in making post-experience evaluations differ from those used in making pre-experience predictions. See id. at 213-14; Lind &
Tyler, supra note 81 at 15.
114. See Tyler & Zimerman, supra note 81, 491.
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Opportunities for Parties’ Discussion and Improved Understanding

McEwen and colleagues concluded that the presence of lawyers did not
alter the nature of discussions in divorce mediation: parties still candidly
expressed their emotions, had the opportunity to present their interests and
listen to the other side, and engaged in a problem-solving exploration of
integrative solutions.115 The present study of domestic relations mediation,
which included some of the same courts, also found that whether mediators
encouraged the parties to say how they felt, summarized what the parties
said, or suggested possible options for settlement did not vary with the
presence of lawyers.116 In other mediation contexts, however, the effect of
lawyers on the nature of discussions might be different.117
Lawyers’ presence in domestic relations mediation had mixed effects on
whether parties felt that their understanding of their own needs, as well as
the needs and views of others, had improved during mediation. There was
no relationship between lawyers’ presence and whether parties felt their
understanding of their children’s needs had improved.118 Representation
had a small and mixed effect on parties’ understanding of their own needs
and concerns: parties who did not have a lawyer in mediation were more
likely than represented parties to say that mediation helped them see their
needs more clearly (48% vs. 45%), but they were also more likely to say

115. McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1368, 1392-93. These findings are based on interviews with eighty-eight divorce lawyers in Maine from 1990 to 1991, plus observations of
mediation sessions. Id. at 1358, 1373.
116. There was no effect of individual or combined representational status. Overall, mediators said they encouraged parties to say how they felt in 92% of cases, frequently summarized parties’ statements in 92% of cases, and suggested settlement options in 83% of cases.
A similar percentage of parties said the mediators had engaged in each of these actions. Of
course, this does not mean that the parties did express their feelings.
117. In general civil mediation, parties’ discussion of emotions, non-monetary concerns,
and settlement options often appears to be restricted. See, e.g., Relis, supra note 108, at
724-26, 733-34, 742-43; Riskin & Welsh, supra note 31, at 864-66, 871-76, 894-97. Because parties are almost always represented in these cases, it is not clear whether this narrowed discussion is due to the presence of lawyers, or whether it would occur even if lawyers were absent, reflecting the mediators’ presumptions about what issues and options are
relevant in these cases. See, e.g., Dwight Golann, Variations in Mediation: How – and Why
– Legal Mediators Change Styles in the Course of a Case, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 41, 61;
Lande, supra note 11, at 880, 885; Relis, supra note 108, at 739; Riskin & Welsh, supra
note 31, at 896-97. Mediators in general civil cases usually are lawyers, while mediators in
domestic relations mediation often are non-lawyers. See, e.g., WISSLER, TRAPPING THE DATA, supra note 32, at 65; Kelly, supra note 43, at 11, 16; Wissler, supra note 11, at 64; supra
notes 34, 38.
118. There was no effect of individual or combined representational status. Overall, 41%
of parties said mediation helped them see their children’s needs more clearly, 57% said no
change, and 2% said less clearly.
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that they saw their needs less clearly (4% vs. 1%).119 Finally, parties were
somewhat more likely to say that mediation helped them better understand
the other person’s views when they did not have a lawyer in mediation than
when they did (69% vs. 59%).120
In sum, representation did not seem to affect the discussion of feelings
and settlement options, at least not in domestic relations mediation. Representation was related to slightly less improvement in parties’ understanding
of the other side’s views, and had a mixed effect on parties’ understanding
of their own concerns.
b.

Parties’ Participation in Mediation and Chance to Tell Their Views

Whether representation was related to parties’ sense that they had a
chance to tell their views varied across studies. In the present study of domestic relations mediation, parties’ representational status was not related
to whether parties felt they had “enough chance” to tell their “views of the
dispute.”121 By contrast, unrepresented parties in a study of EEO mediation appeared to be more satisfied with the opportunity to present their side
of the dispute than represented parties.122
How much or how actively parties participated in mediation, or how satisfied they were with their level of participation, was greater in most studies when parties were unrepresented than when they were represented by a
lawyer. In the present study of domestic relations mediation, parties’ participation, as rated by the mediators, was more likely to be “very active”
when neither side was represented (male party, 86%; female party, 78%)
than when both sides were represented (male party, 59%; female party,
62%).123 When a lawyer for only one party was present, the impact on party participation depended on whether it was the party’s own lawyer or the
opposing party’s lawyer: parties’ participation was more likely to be “very
active” when only opposing counsel was present (male party, 90%; female
119. χ2(2) = 8.09, p < .05, V = .10. Unrepresented parties were less likely than
represented parties to say that mediation had no effect on their ability to see their own needs
(48% vs. 54%). There was no effect of the parties’ combined representational status.
120. χ2(2) = 5.12, p = .077, V = .079. There was no significant effect of combined representational status.
121. There was no effect of individual or combined representational status. Overall, 87%
of parties felt they “had enough chance” to tell their views.
122. The mean ratings were 4.09 and 3.64 for unrepresented and represented parties,
respectively, on a five-point scale. Varma & Stallworth, supra note 84, at 403 tbl.3. The
authors did not report a statistical significance test for this individual question, so this may
or may not be a true difference.
123. Male party (F(3, 636) = 14.40, p < .001); female party (F(3, 626) = 2.66, p < .05).
Overall, mediators said 66% of parties participated “very actively,” 30% “somewhat actively,” and only 4% “not at all actively.”
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party, 80%) than when only their own lawyer was present (male party,
61%; female party, 69%). Thus, parties were about equally likely to participate “very actively” when no lawyers were present as when only opposing
counsel was present, and parties were about equally likely to participate
“very actively” when both parties were represented as when a party’s own
lawyer was present. Taken together, these findings suggest that a reduction
in active party participation in the present domestic relations mediation
study was associated with being represented rather than with whether the
opposing party was represented.124
Lawyers’ presence was related to parties’ “satisfaction with their level of
participation” in EEO mediation. In one study, unrepresented parties appeared to be more satisfied with their level of participation than represented
parties.125 The second study, which involved the mediation of informal
EEO complaints, found that charging parties were more likely to be “very
satisfied” with their “level of participation in mediation” when they were
unrepresented than when they were represented by a lawyer, but that there
was little difference in responding parties’ satisfaction.126 Charging parties
were less likely to be “very satisfied” with their level of participation when
they were represented by a lawyer than by other types of representatives,
but the reverse was true for responding parties..127 Thus, lawyers had a
different effect on parties’ satisfaction with their level of participation for
charging parties than for responding parties, and they had a different effect
than other types of representatives. These findings suggest that it was not

124. These findings appear to contrast with those of an earlier study in some of the same
courts, in which the lawyers reported they generally let their clients take the lead role in
mediation and intervened only when needed. See McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1371-73,
1392-93. Although the lawyers might have exaggerated the amount of party participation,
the program director and the researchers’ observations of mediation sessions confirmed that
the lawyers encouraged their clients to speak during mediation. Id. at 1373. Both studies are
in agreement that parties participated actively in a majority of cases, even when lawyers
were present.
125. The mean ratings for unrepresented and represented parties, respectively, were 4.18
and 3.76 on a five-point scale. Varma & Stallworth, supra note 84, at 403 tbl.3. The authors did not report a statistical significance test for this individual question, so this may or
may not be a true difference.
126. Among charging parties, 76% of those who were unrepresented and 55% who were
represented by a lawyer were “very satisfied” with their level of participation. Bingham et
al., supra note 51, at 371 tbl.11. Among responding parties, 73% of those who were unrepresented and 75% represented by a lawyer were “very satisfied.” Id. at 372 tbl.12.
127. Among charging parties, 72% of those represented by the union and 70%
represented by a co-worker were “very satisfied” with their level of participation. Id. at 371
tbl.11. Among responding parties, 70% of those represented by a co-worker but only 54%
of those with an association representative were “very satisfied.” Id. at 372 tbl.12. See supra
note 126 for the ratings of parties who were represented by lawyers.
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simply having a representative, nor having a legal representative, that was
related to parties’ satisfaction with their level of participation in mediation.
There are several possible reasons why parties’ amount of participation
or satisfaction with their level of participation might be lower when they
are represented and might vary across representatives. First, how much
parties talk during mediation almost inevitably will be reduced when they
are represented, unless their representatives remain totally silent.128 And
how much the representatives participate, or conversely, encourage their
clients to participate, is likely to reflect the representatives’ approach to
mediation and their views of the relative benefits and risks of direct party
participation, which are likely to vary with the type of case, the local legal
and mediation cultures, and the representatives’ experience with mediation.129 In the EEO mediation study by Bingham and colleagues, for instance, charging parties’ lawyers tended to be less familiar with transformative mediation than union representatives and responding parties’ lawyers,
which might have led them to participate more actively than the other representatives.130 This likely would have violated parties’ expectations about
their own level of participation and reduced their satisfaction with their
level of participation.131
Second, parties might feel they have less chance to tell their views or
might be less satisfied with their level of participation when others are
speaking for them because they have less control over what is said than
when they are presenting their own views and concerns. This might be es128. See Bingham et al., supra note 51, at 373-74; Lande, supra note 11, at 892; McEwen
et al., supra note 2, at 1372. Another possible explanation for the apparent reduction in
participation associated with representation is that parties’ representational status might be
confounded with their willingness to speak in mediation. That is, parties might be more
likely to hire a lawyer if they do not feel comfortable speaking in mediation, and their discomfort would also reduce their participation. But this does not seem to explain the findings
regarding parties’ satisfaction with their level of participation; presumably, parties who
hired a representative to speak for them would have been satisfied if the representative did
so. This suggests that “level of participation” might reflect parties’ sense of “participation”
in the mediation process in a broader sense than simply how much they spoke during the
session. See infra notes 132-34 and accompanying text; Part I.B.3.c.
129. See Macfarlane, supra note 74, at 270-76; McEwen et al., supra note 69, at 167-68.
130. See Bingham et al., supra note 51, at 370, 374. Transformative mediation differs
from the forms of mediation commonly used in general civil cases in its emphasis on parties’ opportunity for voice and on the goals of party empowerment and mutual recognition
and understanding, with settlement viewed as a possible byproduct rather than a primary
objective. See Bingham & Novac, supra note 91, at 311.
131. See Bingham et al., supra note 51, at 373 (noting that the information the parties had
received about the mediation program stressed the opportunity for direct party participation). However, this does not appear to explain why responding parties were much less
likely to be “very satisfied” with their level of participation when they had an association
representative, who presumably would have been familiar with the mediation program.
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pecially likely when parties disagree with their representatives about what
should be said and how, or about the relative importance of different issues.132 How well parties believe their representative understands their
interests and objectives, and how accurately their representative communicates their views and concerns when speaking for them, may play a large
role in parties’ sense of voice and satisfaction with their level of participation in mediation, and is likely to vary across mediation contexts and representatives.133 For instance, in the EEO mediation study by Bingham and
colleagues, the pattern of findings regarding parties’ satisfaction with their
participation might reflect that union representatives and responding parties’ lawyers were more likely than charging parties’ lawyers to understand
the workplace setting and to share their clients’ priorities and preferences.134
In summary, there was no consistent pattern across studies as to whether
representation was related to parties’ sense that they had a chance to tell
their views of the dispute. The amount of parties’ participation as well as
their satisfaction with their level of participation generally were higher
when they were unrepresented than when represented by a lawyer in mediation. Legal representation had different effects for different types of parties and had different effects than did non-legal representation, suggesting
that the effects of “representation” on parties’ satisfaction with their level
of participation might be related to how that representation is carried out.
c.

Relationships Among Voice, Participation and Assessments

As noted above, in the present domestic relations mediation study, parties were less likely to actively participate when they were represented than
when they were unrepresented, but they were not less likely to feel they

132. See Bingham et al., supra note 51, at 353, 372-73; Relis, supra note 108, at 702,
725-27, 742-43 (finding that medical malpractice lawyers seldom understood their client’s
objectives and concerns, and these misconceptions affected how they handled cases in mediation); Riskin & Welsh, supra note 31, at 877-82 (illustrating differences between lawyers
and clients in their understanding of the problem, and how those problem definitions affected the lawyers’ approach to mediation and their client’s participation in sessions); Varma & Stallworth, supra note 84, at 413-14; see also ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND
WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 75-76 (2000) (listing
differences in preferences, incentives, and interests among the aspects of principal-agent
conflict); Nolan-Haley, supra note 108, at 1381; Welsh, supra note 107, at 840, 857.
133. See, e.g., Lind et al., supra note 101, at 972; LIND & TYLER, supra note 81, at 30;
Welsh, supra note 107, at 842-43.
134. Bingham et al., supra note 51, at 353, 366, 372-75. However, this does not appear
to explain why responding parties were less satisfied with their level of participation when
they had an association representative, who presumably would have understood the issues
and shared the parties’ preferences.
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had enough chance to tell their views.135 These findings seem to suggest
that parties can feel they have voice indirectly through their lawyers, even
when their actual participation is reduced. An additional finding seems to
support this conclusion: 88% of the parties who mediators said were “not at
all active” in mediation nonetheless felt they had “enough chance” to tell
their views of the dispute. But drawing this conclusion from these data
might not be warranted because the mediators rated the parties’ participation; that is, there might have been less of an apparent disconnect between
participation and voice if the parties had rated their own level of participation as well as their sense of voice.
The present study of general civil mediation did not have this problem
because the parties reported both how much chance they had to tell their
views of the dispute and how much time they (and their lawyer) spoke for
their side.136 A majority of parties (77%) felt they had a considerable
chance to tell their views.137 By contrast, only a minority of parties said
they spent a considerable amount of time speaking for their side (25%).138
A majority of parties said their lawyer spent a considerable amount of time
speaking for their side (64%)139 and talked more than they did (57%).140
Thus, many more parties felt a sense of voice than might be expected given
the amount of time they actually talked during mediation.
Additional analyses of the present study of general civil mediation
showed that, among parties who said they did not speak “at all” for their
135. See supra notes 121, 123 and accompanying text.
136. Parties were asked to rate both “How much chance did you have to tell your views
of the dispute?” and “In speaking for your side, how much of the time did you do the talking?,” each on a five-point scale from “not at all” to “a great deal.” Parties and lawyers,
respectively, also were asked to rate, “In speaking for your side, how much of the time did
your lawyer/your client do the talking?,” on the same scale. There was a great deal of
agreement in the parties’ and lawyers’ ratings.
137. Sixteen percent felt they had some opportunity to tell their views of the dispute and
8% felt they had little or no chance to tell their views.
138. Forty-five percent said they spent some time talking in speaking for their side and
30% said they spent little or no time talking.
139. Thirty-two percent said their lawyer spent some time talking; only 5% said their
lawyer did little or no talking.
140. Only 11% of parties talked more than their lawyer, and 32% talked the same amount
as their lawyer. These analyses considered talking “the same amount” to be when the party
gave the identical ratings for how much they talked and how much their lawyer talked.
Another study of general civil mediation found a similar distribution of party-lawyer participation. See CRAIG A. MCEWEN, AN EVALUATION OF THE ADR PILOT PROJECT: FINAL REPORT 20 (1992) (copy on file with author). One other study found little party participation,
but another found that most parties participated actively. See KEITH SCHILDT ET AL., MAJOR
CIVIL CASE MEDIATION PILOT PROGRAM: 17TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF ILLINOIS, PRELIMINARY
REPORT (1994), available at http://caadrs.org/downloads/niustudy.pdf; Stevens H. Clarke &
Elizabeth Ellen Gordon, Public Sponsorship of Private Settling: Court-Ordered Civil Case
Mediation, 19 JUST. SYS. J. 311, 319 (1997).
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side during mediation, 50% nonetheless felt they had a considerable chance
to tell their views of the dispute.141 Among parties who said their lawyer
spoke “a great deal” for their side during mediation, 77% felt they had a
considerable chance to tell their views of the dispute.142 Not surprisingly,
among parties who said they spent a “great deal” of time speaking for their
side, 91% said they had a considerable chance to tell their views. Thus,
although talking a lot virtually guaranteed that parties felt they had voice,
not talking at all, or having a lawyer who talked a great deal, did not prevent a substantial number of parties from feeling they had a chance to tell
their views. These findings suggest that parties can feel they have voice
through their lawyers. It is not clear, however, why some parties who did
not talk in mediation felt they had voice while others did not; perhaps it
made a difference whether parties preferred not to talk and wanted their
lawyer to speak for them, or whether they were “shut down” by their lawyers, the mediator, or the other side.143
Because representation generally was associated with less party participation but not necessarily with parties’ feeling that they had less chance to
tell their views, additional analyses were conducted to examine how party
participation and sense of voice are related to parties’ assessments of mediation. In the present domestic relations mediation study, parties who said
they had “enough chance” to tell their views were more likely to feel the
process and outcome were fair and to feel less pressured to settle than were
parties who said they did not have enough chance to tell their views.144 By
contrast, how actively parties participated in domestic relations mediation
was not related to their assessments of the fairness of the process or outcome,145 and parties who participated more actively tended to feel more
141. Nineteen percent felt they had some chance to tell their views and 31% felt they had
little or no chance.
142. Fourteen percent felt they had some chance to tell their views and 8% felt they had
little or no chance.
143. See Macfarlane & Keet, supra note 68, at 692 (finding that parties in general civil
mediation were disappointed and frustrated when their lawyers took over the session or
instructed them “to keep quiet and leave the talking to counsel”). Parties said they wanted
“to be ‘supported’ but not ‘shut down’ by their lawyers” during mediation. Id. at 693; see
also LaTour et al., supra note 113 at 273-74 (noting that lawyers’ presentation of the case
could enhance parties’ voice if parties feel their lawyer can present their case better than
they can); McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1363 (noting that some clients want their lawyer
to speak for them); Riskin & Welsh, supra note 31, at 875-76, 894-95, 907-98 (describing
problems that arise when lawyers shut their clients out of mediation sessions entirely).
144. Process fair, r(821) = .364, p < .001; settlement fair, r(668) = .193, p < .001; pressure to settle, r(833) = -.242, p < .001.
145. See also Susan J. Rogers & Claire Francy, Communication in Mediation: Is More
Necessarily Better? MEDIATION Q. 39, 45-47 (Winter 1988) (finding that how much unrepresented parties talked in community mediation was not related to their satisfaction with
mediation or to whether settlement was achieved or the agreement endured). The research-
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pressured to settle than those who participated less actively.146 These contrasting findings seem to suggest that parties’ sense of voice is more important to their experience in mediation than is how much they participate.147
In the present general civil mediation study, parties’ having more chance
to tell their views and speaking more for their side were both related to seeing mediation as more fair as well as having more favorable assessments of
mediation on most dimensions (see the first and second columns of coefficients in Table 2).148 But parties’ sense of voice was much more strongly
related to their assessments than was their amount of participation, which is
similar to the pattern seen above in the present domestic relations study.
Settlement pressure was an exception: feeling one had more chance to tell
one’s views was associated with feeling less pressured to settle, but talking
more was associated with feeling more pressured to settle. Whether parties
talked more than their lawyer in speaking for their side showed a pattern of
even smaller and less consistent relationships with parties’ assessments of
mediation than did the absolute amount parties talked (see the third column
of coefficients in Table 2). Notably, talking more than one’s lawyer was
not related to parties’ views of fairness of the process or outcome, and parties who talked more than their lawyer felt more pressured to settle than
parties who talked less than their lawyer.

ers suggested that the nature of the interaction and discussions might be more important to
parties’ views of mediation and the mediation outcome than the amount of discussion. Id. at
48.
146. Female parties, r(385) = .115, p < .05; male parties, r(363) = .087, p = .097.
147. Two caveats: First, the direction of these relationships cannot be discerned from
correlations. That is, one cannot tell whether parties’ having more chance to tell their views
led to more favorable assessments of mediation, or whether a more fair process involving
less settlement pressure gave parties more chance to tell their views. Second, the relative
strength of the relationships for participation and voice might be an artifact of the fact that
the mediators rated the parties’ participation; the correlations involving participation might
have been stronger if the parties had rated their own level of participation.
148. Parties rated both their sense of voice and how much they participated. See supra
note 136 and accompanying text; see also Lind et al., supra note 101, at 969, 972 (finding
that, in a variety of dispute resolution processes other than mediation, tort litigants’ sense of
control over the way their case was handled was strongly related to procedural fairness
judgments, while how much they felt they “participated in the process of disposing” of their
case was not).
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Table 2. Relationships Between Measures of Party and Lawyer
tion and Parties’ Assessments of General Civil Mediation
Chance Amount Party talked
more than
to tell
party
Parties’ Assessments
lawyer
views
talked
Had chance to tell views

.307***

—
***

ParticipaAmount
lawyer
talked

.230***

n.s.

Fair process

.422

.089

n.s.

.067*

Mediator was impartial

.324***

.047+

n.s.

n.s.

.136***

.046+

.076**

Mediator understood views .391***

***

451

Treated with respect

.261***

n.s.

-.035+

.097**

Not pressured by mediator

.043*

-.061*

-.110***

.104***

-.053*

-.106***

.112***

Not pressured by other side .076***
Had input into outcome

.345***

.210***

.109***

.062*

Understood other’s views

.193***

.085***

n.s.

.072***

Understood own case

.152***

.097**

n.s.

.122***

Satisfaction with process

.255***

.054**

n.s.

.050*

Recommend mediation

.270***

.072**

n.s.

.088***

Fair settlement

.185***

.059+

n.s.

.068+

Notes: The measures of participation were based on parties’ ratings. Positive Pearson correlation coefficients indicate that more participation is associated with more favorable assessments; negative coefficients indicate that more participation is associated with less favorable assessments.
+
p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 n.s.= not statistically significant

Parties’ assessments of mediation generally were more favorable when
their lawyers spoke more for their side than when their lawyers spoke less
(see the fourth column of coefficients in Table 2). Although the relationships were small, how much one’s lawyer talked was significantly related
to more assessments of mediation than was whether parties talked more
than their lawyer. Notably, parties who said their lawyer talked more felt
less pressured to settle than did parties who said their lawyer talked less,
which is opposite the direction of the relationship between pressure and
how much the parties talked.149 And how much their lawyer talked was not
149. Perhaps mediators direct their reality testing at parties when they participate more
actively, but at lawyers when they participate more. And perhaps lawyers’ potential to act
as a buffer from the other side is related to how much they participate, both in absolute
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related to whether parties felt they had enough chance to tell their views,
suggesting that it is something other than how much their lawyer talks that
contributes to parties’ sense of voice.
In summary, although direct party participation in mediation was related
to parties’ sense of voice, a substantial number of parties who did not participate directly nonetheless felt they had a considerable chance to tell their
views. Thus, parties can feel they have voice through their lawyers, though
not all do. Parties’ sense that they had a chance to tell their views was
more strongly related to favorable assessments of mediation than was how
much they participated. Thus, ensuring that parties feel they have a chance
to fully express their views appears to be more important to their experience in mediation than how much they participate directly.
4.

Does Representation Make the Mediation Process More or Less
Contentious?

Many assume the presence of lawyers makes the mediation process more
adversarial, polarized, and contentious, thereby exacerbating conflict and
reducing the opportunity for constructive problem solving and improved
party relationships.150 Some commentators maintain instead that lawyers
dampen the level of conflict in mediation because they are not emotionally
involved in the dispute, are trained to evaluate issues rationally, are likely
to have a more realistic assessment of the probable outcome than their
clients, and often need to maintain a reputation for cooperation with opposing counsel.151 Others note that whether lawyers increase or decrease conterms and relative to their clients. See, e.g., LaTour et al., supra note 113, at 273-74 (suggesting that representatives might serve as a buffer by reducing direct interaction between
the parties).
150. See, e.g., ALFINI ET AL., supra note 22; Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin,
Cooperation and Competition in Litigation: Can Lawyers Dampen Conflict?, in BARRIERS
TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 184, 185 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995); MACFARLANE,
supra note 61, at 148; McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1364, 1373; John Lande, Practical
Insights From an Empirical Study of Cooperative Lawyers in Wisconsin, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 203, 249-50 (reporting lawyers’ perceptions of lawyers’ and parties’ mindsets in litigation-oriented, cooperative, and collaborative practices); Nolan-Haley, supra note 108, at
1380; Reuben, supra note 3, at 1097 (quoting the Supreme Court decision in Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, that counsel “would inevitably give the proceedings a more adversary cast”);
Riskin, supra note 80, at 330.
151. HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISK, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 119-28 (2004) [hereinafter KRITZER, RISK, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS]; DEAN G. PRUITT & PETER J. CARNEVALE, NEGOTIATION IN SOCIAL
CONFLICT 154-56 (1993); Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 150, at 209. Although lawyers’
analytic tendencies might reduce contentiousness during mediation, they also can lead lawyers to overlook or reframe the emotional issues and objectives that often are important to
parties. See Relis, supra note 108, at 702, 725-27, 733-34; Riskin & Welsh, supra note 31,
at 889.
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tentiousness in mediation might depend on how they react to their clients’
positions and expectations and how they choose to advocate for their
clients in mediation.152 Some suggest that the dynamics of the mediation
process itself and its face-to-face nature demand civility and make posturing more difficult, limiting adversarial behavior.153 If parties in cases involving more intense conflicts are more likely to hire lawyers, the presence
of lawyers might be associated with greater contentiousness in mediation,
not because of anything the lawyers do, but because of the more acrimonious nature of the underlying dispute.154
McEwen and colleagues concluded that most lawyers were not aggressively adversarial in divorce mediation.155 In the present domestic relations
mediation study, which included some of the same courts, only indirect
measures were available to examine the effect of lawyers on the tone of
mediation. First, parties’ assessments of whether their dealings with each
other regarding their children would improve as a result of mediation were
examined: presumably, the more contentious the mediation, the less likely
parties would predict their dealings would improve. Parties who did not
have a lawyer in mediation were more likely than parties who had a lawyer
to say that their dealings with each other regarding the children would improve (41% vs. 35%), but they were also more likely to say that their dealings would worsen (16% vs. 10%) as a result of mediation.156 Second, the
effect of representation on whether opposing parties in the same case had
similar or divergent perceptions of mediation was examined: presumably,
the more adversarial and polarized the mediation session, the more parties’
views would diverge.157 Neither the parties’ individual nor their combined
152. MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 132, at 156, 166-70; Beck & Sales, supra note 2, at
1028; Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 986 (1979); Sternlight, supra note 56, at 291-97. Lawyers who have more experience with mediation are more likely to consider not only the
interests and perspectives of their client but also of the other side. See Macfarlane, supra
note 74, at 297, 300; McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1367.
153. McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1368-69.
154. See, e.g., ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 108-12 (1992) (noting that parties who were more
willing to fight and whose preferences were more in conflict with the other side’s would be
more likely to seek legal counsel).
155. McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1368-69.
156. χ2(2) = 6.25, p < .05, V = .097. Unrepresented parties were less likely to say there
would be no change in their dealings with the other parent than were parties with a lawyer
(43% vs. 54%). Parties’ ratings were not related to their combined representational status.
157. In small claims cases, opposing parties had more divergent perceptions of the fairness of the process and the outcome following trial than mediation; trial was seen as more
adversarial than mediation on several dimensions. See Craig A. McEwen & Richard J.
Maiman, Small Claims Mediation in Maine: An Empirical Assessment, 33 ME. L. REV. 237,
258-59 (1981); Wissler, supra note 10, at 335-36, 344. This may be because adversarial
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representational status was related to how similar or divergent their assessments of the mediator, the process, or the outcome were on most dimensions. The one exception was that parties’ views of the mediator’s
neutrality diverged less when the parties had a lawyer than when they did
not.158
These limited findings suggest that the presence of lawyers neither substantially increased nor decreased the adversarialness or contentiousness of
mediation. This conclusion, however, might be confined to the domestic
relations context, in which most lawyers engage in cooperative problem
solving rather than adversarial posturing.159 The professional norm of the
“reasonable lawyer” who tries to reduce conflict and facilitate settlement160
likely developed due to several aspects of family law practice: the substantive legal rules, policies, and economic incentives; the more active and direct involvement of clients in the negotiation process; and the local and
specialized nature of the family law bar.161 Additional evidence suggests
that divorce practice became less adversarial after mediation use became
common.162
To the extent that these same factors operate in other practice areas, or
that the structure of the mediation process itself or greater experience with
mediation reduces lawyers’ adversarial tendencies within the mediation
session, these findings might not be unique to domestic relations mediaprocesses tend to focus more on who is right and who is wrong, so that parties are more
likely to feel there is a winner and a loser. The difference between winners’ and losers’
process assessments has been found to be greater following trial and arbitration than following mediation, settlement conference, and bilateral negotiation. See Lind et al., supra note
101, at 956, 971, 975; Wissler, supra note 10, at 344.
158. Female parties: F(1, 303) = 8.42, p < .01; male parties: F(1, 301) = 3.69, p = .056.
159. McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1365-67 (discussing several studies finding that
most divorce lawyers reduced rather than sparked conflict). But see Schneider & Mills,
supra note 94, at 616-17 (finding that, in bilateral negotiation, family practice lawyers were
more likely to use an ethically adversarial style than lawyers in civil practice, and the two
groups were about equally likely to use an unethically adversarial style).
160. McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1365.
161. MATHER ET AL., supra note 3, at 130-31. “The resulting legal framework thus provided few incentives for divorce lawyers in most cases to try to ‘win big’ for their clients.”
Id. at 131. Interviewed lawyers saw their main goal as reaching a settlement fair to both
sides, and many started negotiations with an offer near what they thought would be a fair
outcome. Id. at 114-17; see also McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1366-67.
162. McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1367. This study made comparisons between
Maine, where court-connected mediation had been mandatory for approximately five years,
and New Hampshire, where there was no court-mandated mediation. Divorce lawyers in
Maine, compared to those in New Hampshire, were significantly more likely to agree that
the goal of negotiation was “reaching a settlement fair to both parties” rather than “getting
as much as possible for their client.” And the volume of motions filed in divorce cases
dropped by 20% in Maine while increasing by 20% to 30% in New Hampshire during the
same time period. Id.
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tion.163 For instance, Kritzer’s research suggests that some of these factors—repeated contact with opposing counsel and economic incentives favoring efficient resolution—also operate in routine personal injury contingency fee cases to produce a norm of cooperation and reciprocity.164 In
bilateral negotiations in these cases, most lawyers made initial demands
and offers that were not extreme and did not employ “scorched earth” tactics, suggesting that a cooperative style predominated.165 In the present
general civil mediation study, a majority of lawyers (67%) said that opposing counsel was highly cooperative in mediation, and only 7% said opposing counsel was uncooperative.166 These findings suggest that, even in
contexts other than domestic relations, lawyers might not substantially increase the contentiousness of mediation.
Because virtually all parties are represented in general civil mediation,
the effect of representation on the tone of mediation cannot be assessed, but
the effect of how adversarial or cooperative lawyers are during mediation
can be examined. Parties in one study were frustrated and dissatisfied
when their lawyers adopted an adversarial approach in mediation, created a
win/lose atmosphere, or were reluctant to negotiate.167 In the present study,
parties’ assessments of mediation on some, but not all, dimensions were
related to how cooperative their lawyers said opposing counsel was in mediation,168 though the relationships generally were small (see Table 3).
Where opposing counsel was more cooperative, parties felt they had more
input into the outcome and had a better understanding of their own case and
the other side’s views, and thought that the mediation process was more
fair and the mediator had a better understanding of their views. However,
163. See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 150, at 203-05, 208-09 (noting that lawyers’
level of cooperation varies across practice areas as a result of how much opportunity there is
to develop a reputation for cooperation, such as whether there tend to be opportunities for
tradeoffs in settlements or whether the size of the legal community permits repeated interactions among the lawyers); Macfarlane, supra note 74, at 315, 318 (finding that differences in
civil litigators’ approaches to mediation were related to their amount of personal experience
with mediation and the local legal culture, including the size and cohesiveness of the bar).
164. HERBERT M. KRITZER, LET’S MAKE A DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE NEGOTIATION
PROCESS IN ORDINARY LITIGATION 105, 122, 129, 133 (1991) [hereinafter KRITZER, LET’S
MAKE A DEAL]; KRITZER, RISK, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS, supra note 151, at 129-31,
234.
165. KRITZER, LET’S MAKE A DEAL, supra note 164, at 77, 105, 118-25, 131-33; KRITZER,
RISK, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS, supra note 151, at 130-31, 153-55. See also Schneider
& Mills, supra note 94, at 616 (finding that 68% of lawyers in civil practice, compared to
61% in family practice, used either a true or a cautious problem-solving approach in bilateral negotiations, rather than an adversarial approach).
166. Twenty-six percent said opposing counsel was somewhat cooperative.
167. Macfarlane & Keet, supra note 68.
168. Lawyers were asked to rate “Was the opposing counsel cooperative in the mediation
of this case?” on a five-point scale, from “not at all” to “a great deal.”
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when opposing counsel was more cooperative, parties saw the mediator as
somewhat less impartial than when opposing counsel was less cooperative.
And cooperation was not related to parties’ sense of voice, settlement pressure, or respectful treatment by the mediator. Notably, the more cooperative the lawyers were during mediation, the more likely the case was to settle.169
Table 3. Relationships Between Lawyers’ Level of Cooperation and Parties’ and Lawyers’ Assessments of General Civil Mediation
Parties’ Assessments
Fair process

.065*

Treated with respect

Mediator was impartial

-.065+

Not pressured by mediator n.s.

Chance to tell views

n.s.

Not pressured by other
side

Input into outcome

.142***

Understood other’s views .099**

Mediator understood
views

.062*

Understood own case

.127***

Recommend mediation

.092*

Satisfaction with process

.117**

Fair process

.430***

Mediator effective

.335***

Mediator impartial

.186***

Parties’ relationship

.316***

Party involvement

.308***

Lawyers’ relationship

.334***

Recommend mediation

.330***

Evaluate other’s case

.204***

Fair settlement

.370***

Evaluate own case

.182***

n.s.
n.s.

Lawyers’ Assessments

Notes: Positive Pearson correlation coefficients indicate that more cooperation is associated
with more favorable assessments; negative coefficients indicate that more cooperation is
associated with less favorable assessments.
+
p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; ***p < .001; n.s. = not statistically significant

169. r = .253, p < .001. See also Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 150, at 209 (stating that
the relationship between opposing counsel has “profound implications” for whether lawyers
can reduce conflict and facilitate settlement).
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For lawyers, greater cooperation in mediation from opposing counsel
was consistently and strongly related to more favorable assessments of
mediation (see Table 3).170 Notably, lawyers who said opposing counsel
was more cooperative thought that the mediation process was more fair and
that the mediator was more impartial, that parties had more involvement in
resolving the dispute, and that the parties’ relationship improved more than
did lawyers who faced less cooperative opposing counsel. Moreover, in
cases that reached a full or partial settlement in mediation, lawyers thought
the settlement was more fair when opposing counsel was more cooperative.
In sum, the limited research findings suggest that the presence of lawyers neither substantially increased nor decreased the contentiousness of
mediation, at least in domestic relations cases. Nonetheless, how the lawyers interacted during general civil mediation made a difference to the
mediation process and outcome. When lawyers were less adversarial and
more cooperative during mediation, the parties, and especially the lawyers,
generally viewed the process and outcome more favorably, and the case
was more likely to settle.
C.

What Effect Does Representation Have on Mediation Outcomes?
1.

Does Representation Facilitate or Impede Settlement?

There are contrasting predictions about the effect that lawyers will have
on settlement in mediation. Lawyers’ greater skill and experience with negotiation could facilitate settlement.171 If lawyers prepare clients for mediation, that could make settlement more likely.172 Lawyers also could increase the likelihood of settlement because they are less likely than parties
to be susceptible to cognitive biases, and thus are able to help their clients
overcome cognitive barriers to settlement.173 If lawyers are aggressively
adversarial and exacerbate the parties’ conflict, that could reduce the likelihood of settlement; but if lawyers are cooperative and able to calm their
clients’ emotions, that could facilitate settlement.174 If lawyers ensure that
170. It is not clear why the degree of cooperation was more strongly and more consistently related to lawyers’ than to parties’ assessments. The correlations between parties’ assessments and cooperation might be attenuated because they involve parties’ ratings of the
process but lawyers’ ratings of cooperation; perhaps what looked like cooperation to the
lawyers did not look cooperative to the parties. Or perhaps parties are less affected than
lawyers by opposing counsel’s tone.
171. See, e.g., MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 132, at 71.
172. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 56, at 320-29; Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie,
Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 77, 79-86 (1997).
174. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
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parties’ views are expressed and their concerns are addressed, that could
encourage settlement; but if they stifle party participation and limit discussions, that could hinder settlement.175 If lawyers buffer settlement pressures from the mediator and the opposing side, and advise their clients to
reject unfair proposals, the settlement rate might decrease; but lawyers
themselves might push clients to settle.176
Settlement was more likely when both parties were unrepresented than
when both were represented. One domestic relations mediation study
found that a full or partial settlement was more likely when neither party
had a lawyer present during mediation than when one or both parties’ lawyers attended.177 The present domestic relations study found that full settlement was more likely when neither party (58%) or only one party (56%)
had a lawyer present in mediation than when both parties had a lawyer
present (44%).178 Partial settlement, however, was more likely when both
parties had lawyers present (39%) than when only one party or neither party had a lawyer present (22% each).179 An EEO mediation study also
found a similar pattern: the settlement rate was highest when both parties
were unrepresented, intermediate when only one party was represented, and
lowest when both parties were represented in mediation.180
Two other EEO mediation studies that examined the effect of representation separately for each party found a different effect for charging parties
than for responding parties. One study found that charging parties who
were unrepresented settled at a higher rate than those represented by a lawyer, but found no differences by representational status for responding par175. See infra note 185 and accompanying text; see also Riskin & Welsh, supra note 31,
at 901.
176. See infra notes 204-205 and accompanying text.
177. The settlement rate was 75% and 48%, respectively. Stuart & Savage, supra note
82. The findings are based on 307 domestic relations cases mediated in a multi-door courthouse program in 1996 and 1997 in Arapahoe County, Colo. Id.
178. χ2(4) = 16.48, p < .01, V = .160. The rate of non-settlement was similar across representation groups (17% to 22%). When only one party had a lawyer present, which party’s
lawyer was present affected the likelihood that full settlement was reached (male party,
45%; female party, 62%).
179. When responses referring to a mediation session other than the final one were included in the analysis, 27% of parties whose lawyers were not present scheduled another
session, presumably so they could consult with their lawyers in the interim, compared to
only 7% of unrepresented parties and 8% of represented parties whose lawyers were present.
These findings suggest that the practice of lawyers not attending mediation could add delay
and expense to the mediation process in some cases by postponing settlement or necessitating an additional mediation session.
180. The settlement rate was 68%, 45%, and 31%, respectively. MCEWEN, supra note 49,
at 42-43. When only one party was represented, the settlement rate was higher when the
responding party was represented (53%) than when the charging party was represented
(39%). Id. at 42-43, 50.
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ties.181 The study involving the mediation of informal EEO complaints
found that charging parties were more likely to settle when unrepresented
than when represented by a lawyer, but that the reverse was true for responding parties.182 Comparing unrepresented parties to parties who had
non-lawyer representatives showed that, for both charging and responding
parties, the settlement rate was either about the same or higher for
represented parties, depending on the type of representative.183 Charging
parties were less likely to settle when they were represented by a lawyer
than by other types of representatives; for responding parties, the pattern
varied depending on the type of non-lawyer representative. Thus, lawyers
had a different effect on settlement for charging parties than for responding
parties, and lawyers had a different effect on settlement than did other types
of representatives. These findings suggest that it is something about the
nature of the representation, not simply having a representative or having a
legal representative, that affects settlement.
What might account for the apparent reduction in the likelihood of settlement associated with the presence of lawyers in most studies? Perhaps
lawyers advised their clients to reject settlement proposals, so that unrepresented parties accepted more settlement proposals than represented parties.
Unfortunately, we lack the information needed to explore this possibility,
namely, the rate at which represented and unrepresented parties received
and then either accepted or rejected settlement proposals.184 Perhaps the
presence of lawyers changed the mediation process in ways that in turn reduced the likelihood of settlement. In the present domestic relations mediation study, for instance, representation was associated with somewhat less
improved understanding of the other side’s views and with reduced party
participation, both of which were related to a lower rate of settlement.185 In
181. McDermott & Ervin, supra note 82, at 57-59. The findings of this study are based
on questionnaires completed by 1,683 charging parties and 1,572 responding parties after
mediations that were conducted under the supervision of the fifty EEOC field offices during
a five-month period. Id. at 50-52. This study did not report the type of representative, but
presumably most were lawyers since these were formal EEOC complaints. See supra note
50 and accompanying text.
182. The rate of full and partial settlement for charging parties was 62% when unrepresented and 50% when represented by a lawyer. For responding parties, the settlement rate
was 63% when unrepresented and 67% when represented by a lawyer. Bingham et al., supra
note 51, at 365-68.
183. For charging parties, the settlement rate was 60% when represented by a fellow
employee and 65% when represented by the union. For responding parties, the settlement
rate was 78% when represented by an association representative and 64% when represented
by a fellow employee. Id.
184. We would need additional information to determine whether lawyers advised clients
to reject proposals because the proposals were unfair or for other reasons.
185. See supra notes 120, 123 and accompanying text. Participation and settlement,
r(628) = .123, p < .01; understanding and settlement, r(838) = .234, p < .001.
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one EEO mediation study, when comparing charging parties who were unrepresented with those represented by a lawyer, the pattern of differences in
their satisfaction with their level of participation was similar to the pattern
of differences in their settlement rates.186 But these parallel patterns for
satisfaction with participation and settlement were not seen for responding
parties.187 Thus, although a lower settlement rate might in part reflect possible changes in the mediation process associated with the presence of lawyers, that does not appear to be the sole explanation.
Another possible explanation for the apparent reduction in settlement associated with the presence of lawyers is that case characteristics related to
settlement are likely to be confounded with parties’ representational status.
That is, cases in which parties are more likely to seek and to be able to retain a lawyer might have certain characteristics, such as involving larger,
stronger, or more complex claims, or involving greater contentiousness or
disparity between positions,188 that tend to reduce the likelihood of settlement.189 EEO mediators rated cases in which both parties had representation as involving more complex legal issues and a stronger substantive
186. See supra notes 126, 182 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 126, 182 and accompanying text. In addition, responding parties
who had an association representative were least likely to be “very satisfied” with their level
of participation, but most likely to settle. See supra notes 127, 183 and accompanying text.
188. See, e.g., KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY, supra note 3, at 33, 82 (noting that parties
might be more likely to hire a lawyer in more problematic cases, and lawyers might be more
likely to take cases with more merit or stronger evidence); KRITZER, RISK, REPUTATIONS,
AND REWARDS, supra note 151, at 84-85 (finding that lawyers’ decisions whether to take
cases were strongly influenced by the potential for liability); MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra
note 154, at 108-12 (noting that parties who were more willing to fight, for whom the outcome was more important, or whose preferences were more in conflict with the other side’s
would be more likely to seek legal counsel); SALES ET AL., supra note 3, at 8-12 (finding that
unrepresented litigants had less complex divorce cases); Bingham et al., supra note 51;
McDermott & Ervin, supra note 82, at 59; Stuart & Savage, supra note 82. But see Leandra
Lederman & Warren B. Hrung, Do Attorneys Do Their Clients Justice? An Empirical Study
of Lawyers’ Effects on Tax Court Litigation Outcomes, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1235,
1261 (2006) (finding that cases where the taxpayer had a lawyer were weaker overall).
Similarly, the type of representative that parties choose might be associated with characteristics of the case or with what they want from a representative. See Bingham et al., supra
note 51, at 354-55.
189. See, e.g., Monsma & Lempert, supra note 94, at 630, 642, 661 (noting that any examination of the effect of representation on case outcomes “must consider how clients acquire or fail to acquire counsel, for outcomes apparently associated with counsel may in fact
be consequences of factors that led to the acquisition of counsel” and that “case or other
characteristics may suppress or distort the relationship between legal representation and case
outcomes”); see also Roselle L. Wissler, The Role of Antecedent and Procedural Characteristics in Mediation: A Review of the Research, in THE BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF MEDIATION: BRIDGING THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 129, 130-31 (Margaret S. Herrman ed.,
2006) (reviewing research findings on the relationships between case characteristics and
settlement).
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showing of discrimination than cases in which one party was represented,
which in turn were rated as more complex and having more evidence of
discrimination than cases in which neither party was represented.190 Moreover, the pattern of differences in these case characteristics across representational status categories was similar to the pattern of settlement rate differences across representational categories.191 Thus, fewer cases might have
settled in EEO mediation when both parties were represented because those
cases involved stronger and more complex claims, not because lawyers
were present in mediation.
In the present domestic relations study, several characteristics associated
with representation also were related to settlement. Represented parties
had higher incomes,192 were married for a longer time,193 and were more
likely to say that they tried to resolve financial issues during mediation
(e.g., division of property, alimony, debts)194 than unrepresented parties.195
These case characteristics were related to settlement in a way that largely
paralleled the relationships between representation and settlement.196 That
is, cases in which the parties discussed financial issues during mediation,197

190. MCEWEN, supra note 49, at 43 (concluding that “[i]t is probable that representation
of parties reflects something about the nature of the charges themselves as well as the orientation of parties toward the charge, one another, and settlement”).
191. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
192. r(805) = .184, p < .001. The parties’ combined representational status also was
related to their combined income (χ2(8) = 21.33, p < .01; V=.279). In cases with the highest
combined income, both parties were most likely to be represented, whereas in cases with the
lowest combined income, one or both parties were most likely to be unrepresented. This
relationship could reflect either the amount at stake or the parties’ ability to pay. See infra
note 225 and accompanying text.
193. r(839) = .095, p < .01. The parties’ combined representational status, however, was
not related to the length of their marriage. Length of marriage is an indicator of case complexity, as shorter marriages tend to be associated with no children and less property. See
SALES ET AL., supra note 3, at 11.
194. χ2(1) = 16.25, p < .001, V=.139; represented parties, 38%; unrepresented parties,
57%. In this program, all contested issues, including property and financial issues, could be
resolved. This relationship could reflect either that parties with disputed financial issues
were more likely to hire a lawyer, or that having a lawyer led to the identification of financial issues that the parties otherwise might not have raised. The parties’ combined representational status also was related to whether financial issues were discussed in mediation
(χ2(2) = 24.04, p < .001, V = .193). Financial issues were more likely to be discussed when
both parties were represented (54%) than when neither party or one party was represented
(30% and 34%, respectively).
195. Representation was not related to several other potential indices of case complexity:
the number of factors involved in the case (e.g., stepparents, claims of substance abuse), the
number of issues relating to the children that the party tried to resolve in mediation, or
whether there was physical violence and its frequency, recency, or severity.
196. See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
197. χ2(2) = 35.71, p < .001, V = .235.
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had higher incomes,198 and were married longer199 were less likely to reach
a full settlement, but more likely to reach a partial settlement, than were
cases in which the parties did not discuss financial issues, had lower incomes, or were married fewer years. A series of additional analyses found
that the effect of representation on settlement was greatly reduced when
case characteristics were taken into consideration,200 suggesting that much
of the observed relationship between representation and settlement was due
to the effect of case characteristics associated with representation.
In sum, lawyers’ presence in mediation correlated with a lower rate of
settlement in most, but not all, studies. This might reflect some changes in
the mediation process associated with the presence of lawyers or with how
lawyers or other representatives conducted their representation during mediation. But the settlement rate might be due as much or more to the effect
of case characteristics associated with representation than to any impact
lawyers had on the mediation process.
2.

Does Representation Lead to Better or More Fair Settlements?

Most of the research that has examined the effect of representation on
outcomes, often finding better outcomes for represented than unrepresented
parties, has looked only at trial or administrative hearing decisions.201 By
contrast, a study of negotiated outcomes found no effect of representation
on outcomes in settled tax cases.202 Perhaps lawyers play a different role
in, and have different effects on, case outcomes that result from the parties’
agreements rather than from a third-party decision.

198. χ2(10) = 24.18, p < .01.
199. r(307) = -.114, p < .05.
200. To briefly summarize the findings of this set of analyses: When the case characteristics were held constant, representational status did not consistently have a statistically
significant relationship with settlement, nor did it show the same pattern at all levels of each
of the case characteristics. Similarly, when representational status was held constant, the
case characteristics did not consistently have a statistically significant relationship with
settlement, nor did they show the same pattern at all levels of representation. In addition,
when representational status was added to a multiple regression equation in which case characteristics had already been entered, representational status added a statistically significant,
but very small, contribution to explaining settlement over and above the effect of case characteristics. The same was true when the case characteristics were added to an equation
containing representational status.
201. See generally Engler, supra note 5.
202. Lederman & Hrung, supra note 188, at 1239, 1264 (noting their results might suggest that “the same specialized training critical for making a case in court is not required for
negotiations”).
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In mediation, lawyers are thought to act “as a crucial check against uninformed and pressured settlements.”203 If lawyers discourage their clients
from agreeing to unfair or unwise proposals, or push the other side to improve their proposals, represented parties would achieve more fair or more
favorable mediated agreements than unrepresented parties.204 Lawyers,
however, may not sufficiently understand or value their clients’ interests, or
they may urge clients to accept or reject proposals that are more in line
with their own preferences or financial and reputational interests than with
those of their clients. If so, then represented parties would be less likely
than unrepresented parties to achieve their preferred or optimal outcome.205
In some jurisdictions and mediation contexts, mediators may educate
parties about the consequences of settlement proposals or have a duty to
raise questions about the fairness of proposals and to terminate mediation if
they feel the settlement would be unconscionable.206 To the extent that
203. NAT’L STANDARDS, supra note 17, §§ 1.4, 11.3 & cmts.; see also, COOLEY, supra
note 73, at 49; MACFARLANE, supra note 61, at 216-18; Ross Dolloff & Patricio Rossi, Mediation Project Gets Results for North Shore Tenants, 16 LEGAL SERVICES REP. 1, 11-12
(May 2006); McDermott & Ervin, supra note 82; McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1327,
1360-61; Reuben, supra note 3, at 1098; Stuart & Savage, supra note 82.
204. See, e.g., MATHER ET AL., supra note 3, at 98 (finding that lawyers repeatedly asked
clients to reconsider settlement offers that might sell them short); KRITZER, RISK, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS, supra note 151, at 158-59 (finding that lawyers did not grab offers
minimally acceptable to their clients, but instead pushed the opposing side).
205. See KRITZER, LET’S MAKE A DEAL, supra note 164, at 64, 99-100, 123; MNOOKIN ET
AL., supra note 132; DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO’S IN CHARGE? 115
(1974); AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM L. F. FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR CLIENTS:
POWER AND MEANING IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 110 (1995); Lederman & Hrung, supra note
188, at 1244; Nolan-Haley, supra note 108, at 1381; Relis, supra note 108, at 706, 734, 74243; Riskin & Welsh, supra note 31, at 896; Sternlight, supra note 56, at 318, 320-28. Studies of lawyers’ interactions with clients during the course of litigation find that lawyers
shape and reframe their clients’ expectations and goals and use many strategies to persuade
their clients to accept their recommendations. See KRITZER, supra note 151, at 119-28, 17076; MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 154, at 109 (finding that parents who said they
wanted sole custody were nonetheless more likely to request joint legal custody when they
had a lawyer than when they did not); MACFARLANE, supra note 61, at 61; MATHER ET AL.,
supra note 3, at 96-99; ROSENTHAL, supra, at 109, 111;. SARAT & FELSTINER, supra, at 10611, 122-25; Lynn Mather, What Do Clients Want? What Do Lawyers Do? 52 EMORY L.J.
1065, 1070 (2003); Relis, supra note 108, at 734-41; Sternlight, supra note 56, at 318. But
see Relis, supra note 108, at 706, 727, 734-37, 740-42 (finding that although over time some
plaintiffs talked less about non-monetary aims and came to see money as a way to express
those aims, plaintiffs nonetheless retained non-monetary objectives even after years in litigation). Seeking to transform non-monetary disputes into monetary terms might be particularly likely when lawyers have a contingency fee arrangement. See, e.g., KRITZER, LET’S
MAKE A DEAL, supra note 164, at 21-24, 45-46.
206. See, e.g., ABA MODEL DIVORCE MEDIATION STANDARDS, supra note 60, §§ XI, 25.4
(“[A] family mediator shall suspend or terminate the mediation process” when “the participants are about to enter into an agreement that the mediator reasonably believes to be unconscionable.”); see also NAT’L STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 8.1.f & cmts.; ROBERT A.
BARUCH BUSH, THE DILEMMAS OF MEDIATION PRACTICE: A STUDY OF ETHICAL DILEMMAS
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mediators are permitted or required to take these actions, and do so effectively, lack of representation might have a reduced effect on mediation outcomes, or at least egregiously unfair settlements might be prevented.207
The effect of representation on parties’ assessments of the agreement
reached in mediation varied across studies. In the present study of domestic relations mediation, representation was not related to parties’ satisfaction with the agreement or to their views that the agreement was evenly
balanced.208 A study of EEO mediation also found no relationship between
representation and parties’ satisfaction with the mediated outcome.209 A
study of special education mediation, however, found that parents who
were unrepresented or who had a lay advocate in mediation thought the
mediated agreement was less fair than did parents who had a lawyer in
mediation.210 Perhaps the latter study found differences because the parties
completed the questionnaire after more time had passed since mediation
(i.e., from one to twenty months later rather than at the end of the session,
as in the domestic relations study),211 giving them more time to reflect on
the agreement.212 Or perhaps the impact of having a lawyer was greater in
this context because the opposing party was always represented by a lawyer,213 which was less often the case in other mediation contexts. Importantly, parties who thought their representative (lawyer or lay advocate)

AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 13-19 (1992); Lande, supra note 11, at 878; McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1332-33, 1397-98, 1405-06; Nolan-Haley, supra note 17, at 811, 836.
207. See McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1333-34, 1391.
208. This was true when looking at the individual and the combined representational
status of the parties. Most parties who settled were satisfied with the final outcome of mediation (83%) and felt the agreement was pretty evenly balanced (77%). All parties who said
the outcome was not balanced thought it favored them; none thought it favored the other
side.
209. Varma & Stallworth, supra note 84, at 402-03. The mean ratings were 3.27 and
3.24 for unrepresented and represented parties, respectively. The authors did not report
statistical significance tests, but this is unlikely to be a true difference.
210. Kuriloff & Goldberg, supra note 53, at 55.
211. Id. at 45 n.59. There was an additional methodological difference, namely, the use
of a scale comprised of fifteen items about the agreement, some of which might have tapped
different aspects of parties’ views of the agreement and, thus, might have produced different
responses than the single measures of outcome fairness used in other studies. The scale
included such items as whether mediation helped the parents get what they wanted for their
child, whether the agreement was worth the emotional costs, whether the agreement reflected their child’s situation, and whether they felt pressured to settle. Id. at 47-48.
212. See also Hannaford-Agor & Mott, supra note 4, at 179-80 (suggesting that it might
be better to examine parties’ assessments of the outcomes at some time after resolution);
Dean G. Pruitt, Process and Outcome in Community Mediation, 11 NEGOTIATION. J. 365,
373 (1995) (finding no relationship between parties’ satisfaction immediately after mediation and several months later).
213. Kuriloff & Goldberg, supra note 53, at 56.
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was more “effective” thought the agreement reached was more fair.214 This
latter finding suggests that characteristics of the representatives or how
they conducted their representation might affect parties’ assessments of
mediation outcomes.
It is difficult to interpret findings regarding the effect of representation
on parties’ satisfaction with the agreement without knowing something
about the nature of the settlement proposals that were exchanged and the
relative rate at which parties in the different representational groups accepted or rejected those proposals. The lack of differences in parties’ satisfaction with the agreement could indicate that unrepresented parties were
as likely as represented parties to detect and reject unfair proposals, so that
the final agreements reached by both groups were equally fair. But the lack
of differences in party satisfaction could instead mask actual differences in
the final agreements if unrepresented parties were unable to accurately assess the fairness of proposals and accepted “objectively unfair” proposals
they viewed as fair,215 while represented parties accepted only “objectively
fair” proposals as a result of their lawyers’ advice. Also, more favorable
ratings by represented parties could reflect either that they obtained better
agreements, or that their lawyers lowered their expectations and convinced
them the agreements were good.216 Or more favorable ratings by
represented parties could reflect that criteria other than fairness, such as
economic pressures and the need to end the case quickly, played a smaller
role in their decisions to accept a proposed settlement than they did for unrepresented parties.217 Parties in the present general civil mediation study
rated the agreement as less fair than their lawyers did,218 which suggests
that parties did not over-rate the fairness of agreements and were not persuaded to share their lawyers’ views.

214. This was true both for parents (r = .38) and for school officials (r = .49). Id. at 57.
See supra note 100 for a description of the “effectiveness” scale.
215. See, e.g., Tyler, supra note 88.
216. See, e.g., KRITZER, RISK, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS, supra note 151, at 120-72;
SARAT & FELSTINER, supra note 205, at 111; David Luban, The Quality of Justice, 66 DENV.
U. L. REV. 381, 405-06 (1989); Sternlight, supra note 56, at 318. Some evidence suggests
that it is unlikely that lawyers are able to convince clients that agreements satisfy their objectives when they in fact do not. See, e.g., Relis, supra note 108, at 706, 727, 734-35;
Riskin & Welsh, supra note 31, at 882.
217. Several studies have found that other factors and pressures, such as the inability to
afford added delay or costs, risk preferences, and impatience to finalize the divorce or the
lack of emotional stamina to hold out, were more important in parties’ decisions to settle
than were considerations of fairness. See, e.g., KRITZER, LET’S MAKE A DEAL, supra note
164, at 137-38; Erlanger et al., supra note 102, at 585, 592, 594, 600; MACFARLANE, supra
note 61, at 220; MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 132, at 100-01, 106.
218. Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation, supra note 32, at 667.
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Two studies examined more “objective” outcome measures. One study
found that represented parties in housing court mediation were more likely
than unrepresented parties to have the eviction “unconditionally or temporarily denied subject to a probationary period” and to get more time to look
for another place to live.219 The second study found that settlements in
EEO mediation involved smaller dollar amounts when charging parties
were unrepresented than when they were represented by a lawyer or other
person, but found no differences in settlement amounts depending on
whether responding parties were represented or unrepresented.220
There are several reasons why it is impossible to draw conclusions about
the effect of representation on settlement outcomes by looking only at the
absolute dollar amount of the settlement, as in the latter study. First, without taking into consideration the charging parties’ claim or the amount in
dispute,221 one cannot tell whether smaller settlement amounts simply reflect smaller underlying claims, or whether the settlements in fact comprise
a smaller proportion of the claimed or disputed amount.222 Second, focusing only on dollar amounts overlooks the non-monetary objectives and settlement provisions that are present in a substantial proportion of cases,223
219. Dolloff & Rossi, supra note 203, at 14. It is not clear whether the outcome data
reported involved only mediated agreements, which is how most cases were resolved, or
also included trial judgments. Id. at 12.
220. E. Patrick McDermott & Ruth Obar, “What’s Going On” in Mediation: An Empirical Analysis of the Influence of a Mediator’s Style on Party Satisfaction and Monetary
Benefit, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 75, 102-05 (2004). These findings are based on questionnaires completed by mediators and parties in 645 cases following mediation conducted under the supervision of the fifty EEOC field offices during a five-month period in 2000. Id. at
90-92. The study did not distinguish among different types of representatives, did not examine the effect of the combined representational status of both parties, and did not take into
consideration non-monetary settlement provisions. Id. at 101 n.109.
221. See, e.g., KRITZER, JUSTICE BROKER, supra note 3, at 143-44, 147, 149 (noting that
“success should be evaluated in terms of what is really at stake,” namely, the amount in
dispute); Lederman & Hrung, supra note 188, at 1239 (using the proportion of tax at issue
that was recovered by the IRS as the measure of “financial outcome”). See generally Neil
Vidmar, The Small Claims Court: A Reconceptualization of Disputes and an Empirical
Investigation, 18 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 151 (1984) (arguing that outcomes must be assessed
relative to the amount in dispute, which takes into consideration both the amount of the
plaintiff’s claim and the amount, if any, for which the respondent acknowledges liability).
222. Non-monetary outcomes also need to be assessed relative to what the parties were
seeking. For instance, it is not surprising that joint legal custody was more likely to be the
outcome when at least one party had a lawyer, given that represented parties were more
likely to request joint legal custody than were unrepresented parties. See MACCOBY &
MNOOKIN, supra note 154. That study also illustrated why the outcome needs to be assessed
in the context of what both sides are seeking (which is comparable to the “amount in dispute”): parties were more likely to get the custody outcome they wanted when the other
party did not contest it than when they did. Id. at 103-04.
223. See MCEWEN, supra note 49, at 52, 55; Wissler, supra note 32, at 667; Bingham et
al., supra note 51, at 372-73; Relis, supra note 108, at 702, 725.
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and thus can give a misleading picture of the outcome. For parties primarily interested in non-monetary remedies, even a substantial monetary outcome might not be seen as satisfactory;224 they might prefer no money or a
smaller monetary settlement in exchange for key non-monetary settlement
provisions. Importantly, both the size of the initial claim and whether it
includes non-monetary components are likely to be confounded with representational status: parties with less money at issue and parties with primarily non-monetary goals are less likely to seek or to be able to hire a lawyer.225 Accordingly, unrepresented parties might attain smaller monetary
settlements as a result of their underlying claims and goals rather than their
lack of representation.226
Examining the content of agreements “objectively” presents additional
challenges of what standard to apply to evaluate the outcome. Studies find
great variability among lawyers in the “objectively proper” monetary value
they assign to the same case.227 And when parties’ objectives and agreements involve non-monetary components or encompass a number of issues
of varying importance, it can be especially difficult to evaluate how favorable or fair the outcome is for each party.228
This discussion illustrates the difficulty of examining the effect of representation on mediation outcomes, whether using parties’ assessments of the
agreement or the agreements themselves. This is particularly true given the
variation in parties’ objectives and the considerations that influence their
decisions to accept or reject settlement proposals, and the confounding of
those objectives and considerations with representational status.
CONCLUSION
The available empirical research findings suggest that the problems unrepresented parties face in mediation, or conversely, the benefits of having
counsel, might not be as great as some claim. For the most part, unrepresented parties do not see the mediation process as less fair, the mediator as
224. See, e.g., Riskin & Welsh, supra note 31, at 880-82.
225. See, e.g., KRITZER, LET’S MAKE A DEAL, supra note 164, at 102, 155 (finding that
contingency fee lawyers were unlikely to take cases with a likely non-monetary outcome);
KRITZER, RISK, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS, supra note 151, at 84-85 (noting that low
damages or inadequate fee potential was a major reason lawyers declined to take cases).
226. See Monsma & Lempert, supra note 94, at 630, 642.
227. See, e.g., NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY 234-35
(1995); Marc Galanter, The Quality of Settlements, 1988 J. DISP. RESOL. 55, 76-77; Neil
Vidmar & Jeffrey J. Rice, Assessments of Noneconomic Damage Awards in Medical Negligence: A Comparison of Jurors with Legal Professionals, 78 IOWA L. REV. 883, 898, 901
(1993).
228. See generally Engler, supra note 5. See also Hannaford-Agor & Mott, supra note 4,
at 178-79.
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less impartial, the pressure to settle as greater, or the settlement as less fair
than do represented parties. Studies that find differences in parties’ assessments of the fairness of the mediation process do not find a consistent
pattern of unrepresented parties viewing the process either as less fair or
more fair than parties with lawyers. Although greater party preparation is
associated with settlement and more favorable assessments of mediation,
this presumed advantage of representation often is not attained because
lawyers do not routinely prepare their clients for mediation. However,
there is some evidence that represented parties might obtain better outcomes than unrepresented parties, though the research highlights the challenge of defining “better” outcomes, especially in light of widely varying
party goals.
The research also suggests that lawyers’ presence in mediation might not
create some of the problems feared. Lawyers do not appear to be associated with more contentious mediation sessions or with more limited discussions of feelings or settlement options. Representation is not consistently associated with parties feeling that they have fewer opportunities to express their views. However, how much parties participate in mediation or
how satisfied they are with their level of participation generally is lower
when parties have a lawyer in mediation, and there is somewhat less improvement in represented parties’ understanding of the other side’s views.
In addition, lawyers’ presence in mediation generally is associated with a
lower rate of settlement, although that appears to be due as much or more
to the effect of case characteristics associated with representation than to
any impact lawyers might have on the mediation process.
Existing empirical research, however, is too limited in several respects to
be able to conclude that lawyers either play an essential role in mediation
or are not needed, or that they are particularly helpful or detrimental to the
mediation process. First, the findings are based on a small number of mediation programs in a few contexts. Mediation programs for different types
of cases and in different jurisdictions differ in many ways, including the
characteristics of the parties, the characteristics of the mediators, the model
or style of mediation, whether mediation is voluntary or mandatory, the
typical length and number of mediation sessions, and the legal context and
local legal culture within which they operate.229 There also are differences
229. See supra Part I.A; supra note 91. See, e.g., Craig McEwen, Examining Mediation in
Context: Toward Understanding Variations in Mediation Programs, in THE BLACKWELL
HANDBOOK OF MEDIATION: BRIDGING THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 81, 87-91 (Margaret S. Herrman ed., 2006) [hereinafter Mediation Context]; Macfarlane, supra note 74, at
250-51, 313-16; McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1353, 1362; Craig A. McEwen, Toward a
Program-Based ADR Research Agenda, 15 NEGOTIATION J. 325, 331-33 (1999) [hereinafter
Research Agenda]; Wissler, supra note 11, at 56-57, 62-64, 71-72.
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across mediation contexts and jurisdictions in lawyers’ views of the mediation process, the appropriate role of lawyers, and the types of issues and
solutions relevant for discussion. These views influence how lawyers
“use” mediation and how they represent clients during mediation.230 Any
of these differences in the nature of “mediation” or “representation” in other mediation programs and contexts could produce different effects on parties’ mediation experience and outcomes.231
Second, studies to date have examined only a small number of measures,
some of which are at a relatively general level or assess effects indirectly.
Systematic observations of mediation sessions and measures that assess in
more detail the content and tone of the discussions as well as the nature of
party and lawyer participation during mediation might find that there are
additional differences associated with the presence of lawyers.232 Third,
some of the apparent effects of representation might instead reflect underlying party or case characteristics associated with seeking and being able to
obtain representation.233 Ultimately, the random assignment of lawyers to
parties is needed to be able to address these confounds. Increasing the
availability of volunteer lawyers or providing counsel at public expense
could supply an opportunity for random assignment of lawyers to parties
that would not otherwise exist: if there are not enough lawyers for all unrepresented parties, lawyers could be randomly assigned to some parties but
not others.234
Fourth, most of the studies are based on mediation sessions that took
place a decade or more ago. Since then, lawyers are likely to have had
more experience representing clients in mediation and possibly have had
more training in mediation advocacy.235 Several studies suggest that lawyers who have more experience as counsel in mediation approach the
process differently than lawyers with less experience: they tend to prepare
their clients more, have a broader conception of relevant issues and options,
230. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Mediation Context, supra note
229, at 88-89; Macfarlane supra note 74, at 250-51, 270-76, 315-18.
231. See supra notes 96, 117, 159-66 and accompanying text.
232. See, e.g., Relis, supra note 108, at 725-27, 733-34, 742-43; Riskin & Welsh, supra
note 31, at 864-66, 871-76, 894-97.
233. See supra notes 188-91, 200 and accompanying text.
234. See Seron et al., supra note 2, at 423-25 (describing how unrepresented parties in
housing court cases, who met federal poverty guidelines and were interested in having legal
representation, were randomly assigned either to receive assistance from a volunteer lawyer
or were told that it was not possible to provide a lawyer).
235. See, e.g., Suzanne J. Schmitz, What Should We Teach in ADR Courses?: Concepts
and Skills for Lawyers Representing Clients in Mediation, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 189,
206-10 (2001) (noting the need for more training in law school focused on representing
clients in mediation rather than being the mediator); Welsh, supra note 80, at 24.
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have greater comfort with and appreciation of client involvement, and
adopt a less adversarial and more problem-solving approach during the session.236 Other evidence, however, suggests that lawyers have become more
adversarial in bilateral negotiation over the past several decades,237 and that
some lawyers might use their increased familiarity with mediation to engage in strategic behavior during mediation.238 Some parties might also
have gained familiarity or experience with mediation, and as a result they
might have different expectations of the mediation process and of their
lawyers than they would have had a decade ago. In some settings, the mediators’ approach and the mediation process might have been “transformed” over time to accommodate lawyers’ preferences.239 Accordingly,
compared to prior studies, research conducted today might find different
effects of representation in some or all mediation contexts or might find
divergence in the effects of representation among different subgroups of
lawyers.
An important additional area for future research is examining the effect
of how representation is carried out.240 Existing research suggests that the
effect that “representation” has on parties’ assessments of mediation and on
the likelihood of settlement varies with the nature of that representation,
including how much lawyers prepare their clients for mediation and how
cooperative lawyers are during mediation. Research needs to examine
what other components of representation make a difference to parties’ mediation experience and what specific elements of each component contribute
to its effects. Understanding more about what lawyers do when
representing clients in mediation, and how that enhances or detracts from
the parties’ mediation experience, will provide guidance on how to improve
the effectiveness of representation in mediation.
In particular, additional research needs to examine how to structure and
balance the participation of lawyers and parties to ensure that parties feel
they have the chance to fully express their views. Virtually all parties who
participate a great deal in mediation feel they have considerable chance to
express their views. Among parties who do not participate at all, a substantial number nonetheless feel that they have a chance to express their views,
but not all do. This suggests that parties can feel they have voice through
236. See Macfarlane, supra note 74, at 274, 276, 295, 297, 300, 320; McEwen et al.,
supra note 2, at 1367-78.
237. See Schneider & Mills, supra note 94, at 613.
238. See Macfarlane, supra note 74, at 256-57.
239. See, e.g., Golann, supra note 117; Lande, supra note 11, at 885; Welsh, supra note
107, at 797-98.
240. See, e.g., Research Agenda, supra note 229, at 329 (stressing the need to document
what “the intervention” [here, representation] actually is in order to understand its effects).
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their lawyers, and that it might be something about the way in which their
lawyers represent them in mediation that affects their sense of voice. Parties who feel they have more opportunities to express their views are more
likely to think the process and outcome are fair than are parties who do not
feel they have a chance to express their views. Studies need to examine
what it is that lawyers can do to facilitate parties’ participation and to ensure that parties feel their views are expressed, even if they choose not to
participate. Ultimately, future research that examines the ways in which
representation in mediation can be conducted most effectively, as well as
the circumstances under which parties might be unable to represent themselves in mediation, is likely to provide more useful information than studies that examine the effect of representation more broadly.241

241. Id. For a discussion of standards or tests for determining competency to selfrepresent in mediation, see GREACEN, supra note 2, at 8-9; Connie J. A. Beck & Lynda E.
Frost, Defining a Threshold for Client Competence to Participate in Divorce Mediation, 12
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 1, 25-29, 35 (2006).

